

**Evaluating the Effectiveness of DFID's Influence with
Multilaterals**

Part A:

**A Review of NGO Approaches To
The Evaluation Of Advocacy Work**

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ACRONYMS

ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADD	Action on Disability and Development
ADF	Asia Development Fund
ALNAP	Active Learning Network on Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Assistance
BOND	British Overseas NGOs for Development
CAA	Community Aid Abroad (Australia). Also known as Oxfam Community Aid Abroad (OCAA)
CAFOD	Catholic Agency for Overseas Development
CEE Bankwatch	Central and Eastern Europe Bankwatch
CIIR	Catholic Institute for International Relations
CSO	Civil Society Organisation (covering more than NGOs)
DFID	Department for International Development
EvD	Evaluation Department, of DFID
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EEWHD	Eastern Europe and Western Hemisphere Department, of DFID
EMP	European Minister of Parliament
EC	European Commission
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
IDR	Institute for Development Research
IFRC&RC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent societies
ISP	Institutional Strategy Paper
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MSF	Medicins Sans Frontier, Netherlands
Netherlands	
NCAS	National Centre for Advocacy Studies, India
NEF	New Economics Foundation
NGO	Non-government organisation
NNGO	Northern non-government organisation
REMAPP	Research, Evaluation, Monitoring, Appraisal, Planning and Policy
SCF	Save the Children Fund
VOICE	Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies
VUFO-NGO	The Vietnam Union Of Friendship Organisation (VUFO)

0. Executive Summary

1. The DFID Report 2001 points out that "Around 50% of DFID expenditure is spent through multilaterals" and of this 87% is classed as "Aid to developing countries". Since 1997 DFID has been committed to using its influence to increase the commitment of multilateral agencies to effective poverty alleviation, and the fit with its own efforts towards the same objective. DFID's strategy has been documented in a series of Institutional Strategy Papers (ISPs).
2. In early 2001 DFID's Evaluation Department (EvD) instigated an internal review of approaches to influencing multilaterals. More recently, the Americas and Transition Economies Policy Department of the Eastern Europe and Western Hemisphere Department (EEWHF) has initiated two external reviews of methods used to evaluate the effectiveness of influencing activities, those used by the private and NGO sectors.
3. This report covers the approaches taken by the NGO sector only. It is based on investigations carried out over five weeks and contacts with approximately 40 organisations, some in much more depth than others. The sampling process has been more opportunistic than systematic, and the result is a constructively critical review of NGO practice, rather than a record of best practice. Evaluations of advocacy activities are not as common as with development projects and of these fewer are in the public domain.
4. Section 2 looks at definitions and their consequences for monitoring and evaluating efforts. Influencing is seen as a generic term, used more by DFID than NGOs, who refer more often to advocacy. Advocacy is differentiated from capacity building in that agreement is an expected outcome rather than a required starting point. Lobbying and campaigning are seen as sub-sets of advocacy, differing in terms of how explicit and public the initial difference of opinion is with the target of the advocacy message. Awareness raising is a precursor to both advocacy and capacity building efforts. Each of these interventions requires a different approach to how they are monitored and evaluated. In addition, it is suggested that DFID's own use of the term influencing could be monitored to check for different implied meanings and their consequences. (See section 2)
5. Section 3 looks at the participants in advocacy activities and the implications for monitoring and evaluation efforts. One definition of advocacy is that it involves representations made on behalf of clients whose interests are of concern. This raises questions as to who those clients are, and harder questions as to how advocates can be accountable to those clients. NGOs have begun to address these questions, but this is less evidently the case with DFID in its influencing work with multilaterals. (See section 3.1)
6. Advocates are themselves an interested party in the advocacy process. NGOs have their own institutional objectives as well as those concerned with client needs. Advocacy efforts typically involve multiple sections within an NGO, each with their own local interests in particular outcomes, and limitations in capacity to monitor these. These need to be managed if the organisation is to come to a conclusion about its advocacy efforts. NGOs can also be the targets of influencing

efforts by others, but efforts are rarely made to explicitly monitor this process. (See section 3.2)

7. The most well known NGO advocacy efforts are those undertaken through networks and alliances, involving other NGOs, other CSO bodies, and beyond. Their non-hierarchical structure presents problems in terms of defining advocacy objectives and aggregating information about the achievement of those objectives. These problems have some relevance to the use of networks within DFID. One theory based approach is to analyse individual participants behaviour, and because their membership is voluntary, to read them as judgements of the value of the networks achievements to date. The other to analyse and compare network campaigns looking for systemic features associated with success. These suggest that mutual accountability practices may be a generalisable indicator of likely success. (See section 3.3)
8. The range of potential stakeholders in evaluations of NGO advocacy activities is large, and arguably much more so than in development projects covering smaller populations in defined geographic areas. In the small sample of evaluations of northern-NGO based advocacy efforts the lowest levels of participation were in the categories of ultimate beneficiaries and local NGO and community based groups. However the breadth of participation is still much wider than that included to date in DFID's own reviews of its ISP strategies. Evaluations of advocacy activities are still not commonplace within northern NGOs. (See section 3.4)
9. Section 4 looks at issues associated with what should be monitored and evaluated. At the level of objectives there are, as expected, some problems shared by all development objectives (specificity, realism). Others are more specific to advocacy. In a multi-stakeholder setting the development of advocacy objectives may itself be a process that needs to be monitored, not just their achievements. The public nature of advocacy objectives effects their content, requiring simplicity, but also oppositional contrasts. Time bound advocacy objectives are common, and have merits in terms of their motivational effects and encouragement to review frequently. However, their limitations include a lack of fit with the speed of expected response by southern NGOs and more so, change by southern governments. (See section 4.1-2)
10. Changing objectives at the strategic and tactical level are common, more so than in many development projects. The main challenge here is to ensure that double-loop learning (about fit of objectives with context) is taking place. This requires, as a minimum, documentation of reasons for changes in objectives along the way. More common still is a plurality of objectives, similar to that found in DFID ISPs. They do allow a buy-in to the strategy by a wider group of stakeholders and some flexibility of response when faced with temporary and local blockages. However what is often missing is a sense of relative priority, making it more difficult to weigh achievements and perhaps signalling the lack of a worked-through strategy. (See section 4.1.4-5)
11. All planned development interventions, including advocacy have a program logic of some kind, a theory of how various actions will lead by a chain of cause and effect to certain desired outcomes. Explicit theories help clarify plausibility,

identify what should be monitored and where to look in a mountain of potential evidence. Within the NGO literature on advocacy there are a number of frameworks for thinking about the intervention process. There are number of generic stage models, specific to advocacy work. Some evaluators have taken a more inductive approach and drawn out "pathways of influence" theories by interviewing participants in the process. There is a fairly widespread agreement about the importance of two or three parallel processes taking place in most advocacy campaigns: direct policy influence, development of capacity of CSOs to influence policy, and creating democratic space for CSOs to do so. Stage theories for the latter have also been developed and have a generic advantage of allowing some sorting and weighting of achievements noted. (See section 4.2.2)

12. Logical Frameworks are a more widely used means for spelling out the chain of cause and effect in a project intervention, and have been used within a number of NGO advocacy interventions. Their more general purpose nature has allowed some NGOs to integrate their advocacy work with other capacity building interventions taking place in a specific setting. Various amendments (mainly added columns) have been made to the framework to provide more fit with advocacy activities. Nevertheless, these are still very much "works in progress". (See section 4.2.3)
13. Another source of theory about programme interventions and their expected effects are the results of evaluation and analyses of previous advocacy activities. A review of a small sample of these suggests they can provide potentially useful lists of what should be monitored. (See section 4.2.4)
14. The review has looked at the advocacy process in terms of two forms of communication: public communications used mainly in campaigns and face to face meeting processes more central to lobbying. NGOs efforts to monitor public communications can address both media and audience responses. In the former case these can include simple quantitative measures (e.g. volume and range of publicity) and more detailed and qualitative analyses of contents and media responses. Opinion surveys have been used to establish baseline attitudes and knowledge, as raw material for public communications and as a means of identifying the effects of public communications. Actual use varies widely amongst NGOs from none at all, to systematic and professional applications. (See section 4.3.1)
15. Systematic approaches to monitoring meeting processes, more central to lobbying efforts, seem to be less common. Evaluation and progress reports note a wide range of characteristics of meetings that in particular contexts signal significant achievements or changes. Making generalisations about their relative importance seems more difficult and may be inappropriate in most cases. However, there are arguments for the significance of events that signal the establishment of trust between the parties. The risk is that this may not necessarily signify movement of the relationship towards the advocacy objectives. (See section 4.3.2)
16. The perceived legitimacy of the NGO advocate is an asset, whose status can change over time as a result of campaigning and lobbying work. In that respect it can be seen as a long-term process indicator. A number of writers on NGO

advocacy have listed various indicators of credibility and legitimacy and in some cases the main sources of legitimacy. It is clear that NGOs have better claims to legitimate involvement and influence in some areas than others. Associated with these differences are differences in risks of failure, which can also be the basis for weighting any subsequent achievements. (See section 4.3.3)

17. Monitoring policy change is dependent on a clear definition of policy, and is aided by ability to differentiate some generic types of policy change, and their relative importance. Legal definitions vary in their emphasis on authorities involved, and the explicit and public nature of policy statements. In practice NGOs pursue a wide range of type of policy change (examples listed). Some analyses of NGO advocacy have differentiated stages in the policy process and levels of policy. In terms of stages it has been argued that NGOs have focused on the agenda setting and policy framing stages but have often neglected development implementation and monitoring. (See section 4.5.1)
18. Budgets are a particularly important type of policy statement signalling relatively solid commitment to specific intentions and priorities. NGOs frequently monitor changes in budget allocations, and in some cases actual expenditure. Indian NGOs have turned their attention to the budget process, especially the accessibility of budget information, both to elected representatives and to the public. The main challenge for many northern NGOs here is not the availability of data but more systematic reporting and analysis of the significance of changes in budget allocations. (See section 4.5.2)
19. Implementation of changed policies has been monitored by NGOs by three means. Where policy change is more local, the follow up of policy implementation is feasible. Whether it is done so in practice seems to depend in part on whether the scale of the expected change is seen as being worth the cost. The second approach has been to include within proposed policy changes commitments by the implementing body to report on progress with implementation, and even the impact of those changes. The third approach has been to seek agreement within a proposed policy change to allow independent monitoring, often in addition to that expected to be undertaken by the implementers themselves. These strategies vary in cost, and who bears the costs. The willingness to bear these greater costs, especially by the policy implementers, may signal greater commitment to implementation, greater likelihood of implementation, and perhaps even the likelihood of positive impact on the ground. (See section 4.6)
20. There are relatively few advocacy campaigns that have developed their own independent procedures for assessing the impact of specific policy changes they have been advocating, at the level of poor communities in developing countries. Where this has been done there has been a corresponding concern for the development of long term local capacity to monitor policy impact. More often development NGOs use their own presence or that of their partners, in effected countries to gather information about policy impact. Where they have invested the most in directly assessing impact has been in the effects of policies that may need to be changed e.g. costs-sharing in the health sector. (See section 4.7)

21. Section 5 looks at issues associated with the collection and analysis of information about the effectiveness of advocacy. There is little evident enthusiasm for the collection of baseline data in advocacy work. The guidelines that have been provided argue instead for more attention to be given to systematic recording of whatever evidence becomes available in the course of the advocacy work, without excessive concern for methodological correctness. This is more consistent with the fact that it is the lack of historical data about the course of events, rather than initial conditions, which is the bigger problem for evaluators. Survey methodology is most well developed in the area of public communications and but less so within advocacy evaluations. Within advocacy evaluations there is a particular risk of not talking to those who oppose the advocated change, and its associated advocates. (See 5.1.1-2)
22. A significant constraint on the disaggregated analysis of advocacy impact seems to be the limited time available for the evaluation itself. The large scale of advocacy initiatives, specially those involving alliances, poses problems of completeness and comparable quality of data, but some evaluations have treated this as part of the real world and focused on how stakeholders themselves have interpreted that data. (See section 5.2.1-2)
23. NGOs have experimented with different approaches to the representation of the progress of advocacy campaigns over time, combining timelines and a second set of variables (stakeholders, types of forces present, etc). The complex net of interactions looks more like real life and may be a viable compromise between "the chaos of purpose and accidents" that is policy making and the simplifying narratives needed by policy makers and their lobbyists. (See section 5.2.3)
24. The appropriate management of conflicting views on desired ends and effectiveness is especially important in advocacy work, where differences are the prime mover. While multi-stakeholder participation in evaluations is important there is a risk of a de facto consensualist approach to establishing what is true glossing over some unavoidable but important differences and the fact that some stakeholders views should be accorded more weight than others. (See section 5.2.4)
25. The need for analyses of cost-effectiveness and efficiency of advocacy work is widely recognised by NGOs, but in practice little such analysis is undertaken. This reflects the lack of appropriate cost data rather than the availability of methods to do such analysis. Simple measures of relative cost effectiveness are well within the capacity of NGOs. (See section 5.2.5)
26. The difficulty of attributing responsibility for any observed changes in policy is also widely recognised by NGOs as a problem. Within NGOs attribution claims can effect resource allocation, and therefore need to be made. Outside NGOs they can create ill-will and undermine alliances. However, exposing internal claims to more systematic public exposure may also be a means of reality testing and tempering the scale of such claims. Within organisations explicating and questioning tacit knowledge about interventions and impact has been found useful. The main problem with NGO claims to effectiveness of their advocacy work is not the lack of sophisticated methodologies for analysing attribution, but

simply that of decontextualised reporting. That is, the omission of what was not achieved by the NGO and what the other parties and did and did not achieve. (See section 5.2.6)

27. Section 6 outline in brief the next steps that could be taken, regarding the contents of this report. In addition to distributing this report within DFID for comment and response, it is also hoped that copies can be made available to all those NGOs who have contributed interview time and documents to the review. There are two possible directions to go thereafter. One is to look within DFID and ask how the issues and methods discussed in this review could be related to the tasks of monitoring and evaluating the ISP objectives. The other is to continue to look outward at how the contents of this review could be selectively developed in more detail. Five main areas have been identified for consideration: the behaviour of NGOs, the responses of those targeted by NGO advocacy efforts, the approaches taken by other bilateral agencies, and a number of issues concerning methods. (See section 6.1.-2)

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1. Background

1.1 The objectives of this report

The DFID Report 2001 points out that "Around 50% of DFID expenditure is spent through multilaterals" and of this 87% is classed as "Aid to developing countries". The largest recipients are the European Community, the World Bank, the UN agencies and the Regional Development Banks. In a number of regions, most notably the Americas, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, these organisations are the main means through which UK development aid is channelled. DFID's own bilateral aid programs in these regions are relatively modest in scale.

In the 1997 White Paper the government made a commitment to "*use our influence in the multilateral system to increase international commitment to poverty eradication and work in such a way that our multilateral and bilateral efforts complement each other.*" Since then DFID has developed Institutional Strategy Papers (ISPs) for all the multilateral development agencies with which DFID has a substantial relationship. They spell out the types of changes that DFID thinks are essential to the improved functioning of those agencies. They have been followed by detailed work plans, progress reports, and in two cases a subsequent revision of the original ISP. On a wider front the Evaluation Department has recently undertaken a scoping study of DFID's approach to "influencing" work (Spicer, 2001).

That review has now been complemented by two related initiatives undertaken by the Americas and Transition Economies Policy Department of the Eastern Europe and Western Hemisphere Division (EEWHD) of DFID to identify appropriate methods of monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of influencing work. This review looks at what can be learned from NGO advocacy work. A second and parallel review by ITAD will look at private sector approaches.

1.2 The approach taken

The Terms of Reference (Appendix A) for this review ask for information on "*best practice on evaluating influencing activities within NGOs*". This is a challenging task considering the wide range of NGOs involved in advocacy work (international and domestic, developmental, environmental and human rights) and the expanding interest in advocacy, including NGOs who have previously stayed clear of this form of engagement (e.g. Comic Relief, Tearfund). Within the NGOs contacted during this review there is a strong interest in the question of how to monitor and evaluate advocacy work, but few that would claim they are at the leading edge. In addition, and perhaps not surprisingly, a number of NGOs have expressed reservations about releasing copies of evaluations of their advocacy work, more so than is normally the case with evaluations of development projects.

Given these conditions I have attempted a constructively critical review of the information available about different approaches to monitoring and evaluation of advocacy work. The sampling process has been more opportunistic than systematic. NGOs were contacted through three means:

- An initial broad inquiry for information was publicised through three email networks (REMAPP, ALNAP and XCEVAL), and via the Monitoring and Evaluation NEWS web site¹.
- NGOs engaged with multilaterals working in Eastern Europe and Central Asia were identified through DFID and the NGO liaison offices of the multilaterals concerned.
- Other NGOs based in the UK, and already known to the consultant were contacted directly.

The review has been written without a detailed knowledge of the specific needs of different sections within DFID engaged in influencing work. However, a small number of interviews were conducted with DFID staff responsible for and working on the ISPs for the EC and EBRD.

The author is a Social Development consultant specialising in M&E². While having a long involvement with the NGO sector in the UK and elsewhere he is not an expert in advocacy practice.

1.3 Acknowledgements

The completion of this review has been dependent on the co-operation and assistance of a wide range of people, including DFID staff, NGOs and independent consultants.

I would like to give special acknowledgement to the work of Jennifer Chapman, Amboka Wameyo and Alan Hudson, whose previous writings on NGO advocacy work have provided an important resource and starting point for this review.

I would also like to thank the following NGOs for making available their advocacy documentation and staff time for interviews: CIIR, Tearfund, SCF, Oxfam, ActionAid, BOND, VOICE, INTERACTION CAA Australia, MSF Netherlands, NCIAS India, Bankwatch Eastern Europe, ADD, Novib, Christian Aid, HelpAged, NEF, IDR, CARE, and CAFOD.

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¹ <http://www.mande.co.uk>

² Cambridge, UK. Email: rick@shimbir.demon.co.uk, Web sits <http://www.swan.ac.uk/cds/rd/rd1.htm> and <http://www.mande.co.uk>

2. Definitions and their consequences

2.1 Influencing and Advocacy

How can we monitor or evaluate some thing like "influencing" if we don't know what it is in the first place? In the November 2000 EEWHD workshop on "working with multilaterals" there were four different interpretations on influencing. One contributor to the Spicer study compared the degree of "internal linguistic confusion" to that which existed before ODA introduced the Logical Framework. In most cases NGOs do not use the term, but talk about advocacy instead. Even there some evaluations have noted substantial confusions in terminology (CAA, 2001). There is clearly some confusion and it needs to be addressed.

Spicer's response has been to adopt a very broad definition: "*The 'influencing' agenda is used throughout as a proxy term for our engagement, collaboration, advocacy and policy dialogue with partners, including, but not restricted to multilateral organisations*". A similar approach has been taken outside of DFID. Hudson's (2000:2) review of the advocacy work of 32 NGOs in Britain also defines advocacy in broad terms as: "*the use of information to improve the lot of NGOs intended beneficiaries*".

While some NGOs might take the same tolerant approach, the trouble here is that this definition is so broad that it could include organisational capacity building work and even community development work.

However it does seem that there is an important difference between advocacy work and these other types of development interventions. Organisational capacity building is normally expected to take place within a mutually desired relationship and involve the transfers of knowledge and skills that are in *demand*, even if the full nature of that demand is not evident from the outset of a relationship. The same applies to community level work.

But with the advocacy work that NGOs are involved in the targeted organisation is not normally expressing a demand for help. Often quite the opposite. There is often a significant element of lack of interest, unwillingness and perhaps even resistance (e.g. by governments with debt cancellation). Within the confines of the immediate relationship it is supply rather than demand driven³.

The consequences of this difference in the relationship can very significant. The people the NGO is trying to influence are likely to be:

- Much less accessible to speak to in the first instance
- Much less willing to co-operate in monitoring and evaluating what is achieved thereafter.

There is one other important difference. In an advocacy relationship agreement on key issues may be an important *outcome*, whereas in capacity building relationship it is

³ There may however be a significant demand for such change from a wider constituency, including the ultimate clients of those organisations.

more likely to be an important *precondition*. As will be discussed in Section 4, the *content of agreements* reached are an important focus for monitoring and evaluation efforts focusing on advocacy.

From this perspective, it may be appropriate to see advocacy as compliment to organisational capacity building work, as defined above. This interpretation would recognise the simple fact that conflicts of interest can and do exist between organisations and their intended beneficiaries, or wider groups effected by their actions. In such circumstances change often needs to be initiated by external parties, rather than waiting for an internal awareness of the need for help to change. More widely, advocacy can be seen as an important part of *institutional* development: the promotion of more generalised rules about what such *types* of organisations should be doing.

This definition of advocacy is more in tune with Roche's (1999:192) preferred definition of advocacy as "the strategic use of information to democratise unequal power relations and to improve the conditions of those living in poverty or who are otherwise discriminated against"

The rest of this review will look at influencing defined in the narrowest sense above, as advocacy. Monitoring and evaluation of influence within the context of an agreed organisational capacity building relationship should be much less problematic. It should be possible to identify what is necessary to do, and to monitor, through the joint construction of a Logical Framework, or the use of other planning devices.

One caveat is needed at this point. It has been pointed out by Chapman⁴ that in practice advocacy and capacity building efforts often *appear* to overlap. An advocate may find it more useful to operate as far as possible under an assumed agreement over objectives, rather than highlighting major differences. Or, people who think they are doing capacity development may in fact be doing advocacy work.

A similar overlap in practice was noted in a recent DFID discussion about ISP revisions "At present, ISPs are used to communicate both DFID's strategy for work with an institution and the institution's own strategy to achieve their own goals. ISP reviews therefore need to cover both strands, but the indicators and evaluative framework for each will need to be different."

2.2 Lobbying and campaigning

Lobbying and campaigning are sometime treated as being synonymous with advocacy. However within most NGOs contacted they were seen as sub-categories of advocacy work.

The distinctions between lobbying and campaigning have implications for monitoring and evaluation efforts, and are therefore worth exploring. Those identified so far have been summarised in the following table:

⁴ Personal communication, 8/6/01

Campaigns	Lobbying
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Larger numbers of participants • Media mediated contact • A publicly visible event • A more explicit conflict of views • Simpler messages 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Smaller number of participants • More direct contact • A relatively private process • More common ground • More detailed messages

M&E implications

- Large number of participants may mean it is more difficult to find consensus on the value of any results.
- Media mediated contacts may make it more difficult to track the chain of influence
- The public nature of the process may make it easier to independently verify what took place
- It may be easier to track the impact of simple contrasting views, versus that of more complex and nuanced messages.

Various writers within and outside NGOs have further differentiated different types of lobbying and campaigning

Raffa (2000:1) has differentiated lobbying in terms of *direct* (contact with legislators or policy makers) versus *grassroots* (via legislators' local constituencies). These differences imply differences in accessibility of information, especially about what action has since been taken. He has also differentiated campaigning, in terms of *party political* (for/against) and *non-party political*. This distinction implies differences in the risk of bias in stakeholders' assessments of impact.

Jordan and Tuijl, (1998:7) of Novib have differentiated four types of campaigns, based on four aspects of the accountability relationships between the participants (see Section 3 below).

Looking across advocacy as a whole, Nelson (1999:7) has differentiated four "strategic postures":

- attack, which seeks to weaken or do away with the target organisation
- confront, which aims to force a change, rather than primarily to persuade of the merits of the change
- persuasion, which generally relies heavily on allies within the organisation
- co-operation, which involves entering into a process of joint learning by working with the organisation.

The latter two are more consistent with lobbying and the former more with campaigns.

2.3 Awareness raising and advocacy

Awareness raising is a common part of many agencies work, yet it does not fit the definition of advocacy work used above. A review of CIIRs work on EU drugs control policy in Latin America in the 1990's notes how much of their effort was initially aimed at awareness raising, and only later on became concerned with the promotion of specific types of policy change. Awareness raising in itself did not involve any explicit agreements being reached about desired changes. It was simply the provision of information, which was then expected to become part of the recipient's basis for further decisions.

In some cases awareness raising does involve some implied expectations about the acceptance of certain views of the world and their significance. While the Boycott Esso Campaign does not seem to be aimed at changing Bush's decision about drilling for oil in Alaska⁵, the emphasis on creating awareness of the scale of opposition implies some expectation that this will have a salutary effect on their subsequent behaviour.

More often awareness raising is seen as the first stage of a campaign or lobbying effort. In Eastern Europe the CEE Bankwatch Network's intention "To create public awareness about international Financial institutions activities in Central and Eastern European countries and their social and environmental impacts" ⁶ is the first objective within their overall advocacy strategy

It may be possible to summarise the relationship between awareness raising, influencing, advocacy, capacity building, lobbying and campaigning by the use of a series of nested categories, as follows:

Awareness raising	Capacity building	Lobbying	Campaigning
		Advocacy	
	Influencing		
(all being types of communication activities)			

Because awareness raising is about changes in knowledge and attitudes but not any expected change in *behaviour* awareness raising efforts are likely to be more difficult to monitor and evaluate than the impact of advocacy activities (as narrowly defined above). This report will not explore the monitoring and evaluation of awareness raising in detail (but see Section 4). However, DFID funded research into the effectiveness of development education is currently being undertaken by Dr Ann

⁵ Email communication with campaign organisers

⁶ <http://mirrors.zpok.hu.www.bankwatch.org/overview/goals/goals.html>

McColloum at the University of Manchester⁷. There is also a large body related experience in the fields of health education and social mobilisation, as promoted by UNICEF.

2.4 Implied meanings

There are other differences in the meanings of advocacy and influencing that are less explicit and more implied than those discussed above. It may be worthwhile monitoring the circumstances within DFID where the word "influencing" is used, and preferred. For example, does its use signify:

- Lack of a constituency for the proposed change?
- A lack of confidence in the merit of proposed change?
- A denial of conflicts of interests associated with the change?
- A desire to avoid public or explicit discussion of the change?

If so, the word *may* signal the presence of an inappropriate advocacy strategy.

The same approach could be taken with concerns about influencing initiatives being the expression of an "imperious" attitude, an anxiety within DFID documented in Spicer's scoping study. They may signal uncertainty about the position being promoted and who should be leading the relationship.

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3. Who participates and what difference does it make?

3.1 Who and where are the Clients?

Action for Disability in Development (ADD) and its partners attempt to influence policy makers to be inclusive of disabled people. However "ADD makes an important distinction between advocacy and influencing...ADD believes there is a danger that the word advocacy can be used to increase the credibility of a campaign by insinuating that it is being done on behalf of larger constituency. Advocacy on behalf of other people can be empowering if it is being done at their specific request, truly represents their wishes and ensures that their voice is heard. However if advocacy is done without any of these elements it can actually dis-empower those it claims to be supporting, by misrepresenting and taking away another's voice"⁸. They have adopted one dictionary definition, which is that an advocate not only has opinions, but expresses them to someone *on behalf of a client*.

Explicit recognition of advocacy as being on behalf of someone else implies that monitoring and evaluation might mean looking in two directions, back to the initial client as well as out to the intended target audience. This is recognised in the list of "*Key questions for assessing advocacy work with clients and audiences*", provided in the conclusions of Roche's (1999:232) chapter on "Impact Assessment for Advocacy", in BOND's Guidance Notes on Advocacy, and in Chapman and Wameyo's (2001) scoping study on monitoring and evaluating advocacy for ActionAid. (See Appendix B)

The idea of NGO advocates having clients to whom they are accountable is not without its problems. Christian Aid have commented that :

"There are however difficulties in assessing the client side of the relationship: intended beneficiaries often do not know they are being advocated for; in many cases they do not have a say about who will advocate on their behalf and [they] have little influence over their advocates. Talking to intended beneficiaries and understanding their perceptions of impact is even more difficulty than in development projects, where they are at least participating in a direct way" (Chapman and Wameyo, 2001;23)

These issues are becoming more pressing as NGOs become more successful in gaining access as observers and participants in international fora organised by the UN and other multilateral agencies. Questions are being raised by less sympathetic quarters as to the source of their legitimacy, who do they represent and who elected them? (Economist, 11/12/99)

To what extent do similar problems also apply to DFID staff wanting to promote change within the WB and EC, on behalf of UK taxpayers and third world poor? In one sense legitimacy is not a problem, because DFID is formally accountable to the UK public through parliament, but the *effectiveness* of this mechanism is limited in effects by its necessary use of highly aggregated descriptions of plans and

⁸ Email communication from Rebecca Yeo, ADD, 27 June 2001

performance. However, at least with the UK and other European publics DFID has the possibility of being more directly accountable to them through the use of the web, an important medium of transparency. For example, by making ISPs and progress reports available. At present the ISPs for UNIFEM, EC and IFRC&RC are on the web, but not their respective progress reports. Accountability to the second set of clients, the expected beneficiaries of the multilateral agencies within recipient countries is more problematic, being dependent on the nature of government and civil society in those countries.

There have been two trends observable in many NGOs that are addressing the problem of *functional* accountability to clients mentioned above. The first is a trend within NGOs towards greater integration of northern based lobbying and campaigning work with southern focused direct project funding operations⁹. In the 1980's these linkages were non-existent in many NGOs. Ideally, improved integration should strengthen NGOs' rights to act as advocates where they are based on expert knowledge. In practice recent self-evaluations by NGOs such as Oxfam suggest that reconciling North-South and South-South differences in advocacy priorities is not easy. Similar issues of integration may exist within DFID in the relationships between those responsible for country programmes and those for relations with multilateral institutions.

The second trend is towards increasing investment in capacity building of southern NGOs and civil society in general to undertake their own advocacy work, independently and in collaboration with northern NGOs. Associated with this trend is a change in the language being used. Tearfund advocacy documents refer to the need to move more towards "speaking *with*" others and not just "speaking *for*". Action Aid is talking more of "people centred advocacy", referring to advocacy initiatives based in and often focused on events in the South

DFID itself has been devolving funding to civil society organisations since the mid-1990s, and has funded some of the NGO capacity building activities referred to above. However, while frequently part of DFID's country programmes, NGOs' roles in the ISPs seems to have been limited to participation in their formulation. The roles of southern NGOs is less visible still, through they may have more valid claims to speak on behalf of poor communities.

These issues will be returned to in Section 4.4 on program logic

3.2 The advocates as an interested party

Organisations have their own interests as well, as those of their clients, to look after. In some NGO advocacy work these interests are explicitly identified as objectives. Oxfam International's Education Now Campaign included 3 internal change objectives as well as 5 external change objectives¹⁰. This seems to be a positive development, in that being out on the table any potential conflict may be more visible,

⁹ Amongst those interviewed this includes Oxfam, ActionAid, CAA, Christian Aid and Tearfund at least

¹⁰ For example, one internal objective was ""build a sense of OI identify and harness the collective energy of various affiliates effectively"

and it may be easier to track the relative allocation of resources. The evaluation of the campaign examined both internal and external objectives

In some cases an organisation's own interests may be conflated with those of their clients. Media coverage is a widely used measure of interim success in advocacy work. One ex-member of an environmental NGO mentioned their preoccupation with column inch measures of media coverage, because primarily of its significance as publicity for their organisation.

Organisation's also have interests in maintaining relationships with significant others in their environment. In their evaluation of their own advocacy work CAA (Australia) have commented

"A danger in engaging in high level lobbying is that the organisation becomes open to influence as it seeks to both be acceptable to and influential of the target groups. Community Aid Abroad does not speak for its partners, it presents its own views, which are informed by partner groups. It has to maintain a very difficult balance of finding points of communication with target institutions while maintaining accountability and communications with partners." (Kelly, et al, 2001)

Their proposed response is to explore "external evaluation procedures which allow access by partners and by independent observers to assess the processes undertaken for advocacy work, partly for the very purpose of examining such balances."

In DFID's November 2000 workshop on influencing the possibility, and even desirability, of influencing being a two way process was noted by some participants. This form of reciprocal change (effecting the advocate organisation) should in theory be much easier to monitor. However, the problem here is likely to be the *willingness* of the advocate to recognise that this is a desirable or even possible outcome, and therefore in need of monitoring. Two incidents known to me suggest that this is a real problem.

1. In 1999-2000 the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre in Hanoi, Vietnam commissioned a "Strategic analysis of INGO methods and impact in Vietnam 1990-1999." In an interview during the writing up stage, the consultant researcher said that while the study had paid a lot of attention to how the NGOs had effected GoV policies and practice they had not looked at how the GoV had effected the NGOs. In my own experience of NGO work in Vietnam from 1996 to 2000 it is highly likely that there would have been such effects.

2. INTERACTION is a US advocacy umbrella organisation focusing on advocacy with the US government and UN bodies. In its 1999/2000 annual report to Ford Foundation, its main donor, amongst the many references to it is advocacy work activities and achievements there is no reference to how the US government has effected INTERACTION's own policy positions and strategies. This despite the fact that most of its advocacy activities involved engagement with the US government.

In the case of DFID's relationship with the World Bank it is already recognised that DFID is influenced, and this is seen on balance as a positive process. But as far as I

am aware the process is not systematically monitored, and process is not recognised as a significant one within the ISP for the World Bank¹¹. It may be that the solution proposed by CAA above is more appropriate in these circumstances. That is, monitoring by a third party, rather than internal monitoring.

As well as organisations having a collective self-interests at stake in advocacy work, there are also often internal differences in interests, which have consequences.

Within the larger NGOs there is typically more than one section of the organisation involved in advocacy work. Different units may be responsible for media contacts, public campaigning within the north, relationships with government and other donor agencies, capacity building work in the south, and funded development projects in the south. In his 1997 study Norrell found that advocacy responsibility was centralised in one department in only 3 of 18 UK NGOs that he surveyed. To be successful some degree of co-ordination is needed between these units. Some of that may be mandated from on high, but more often, it may have to be won over by a unit championing an issue. This is especially the case within alliances and confederations such as Oxfam International and Save the Children. Where it is voluntary the scale of such cross-unit co-operation may be a useful process indicator for tracking relative progress with various advocacy objectives.

Different units within NGOs face different constraints, which effect where they invest their effort, and where information about results is more or less likely to be available. Units funding development projects deal with substantial sums of money and relatively long term relationships that need some degree of long term planning. It is feasible to set up long-term goals, and to expect some associated monitoring of their achievements. If the pressure to manage disbursements on time is not too great some information about long term achievements may be available. On the other hand, media units have to exploit opportunities as they arise, and make sure that the information that they do put out is accurate and appropriate. The available information about the success of their work is likely to be more focused on immediate outputs and outcomes, for example, media usage and response to what they have distributed. The M&E challenge here is how to pull different types of information together from such different units, while recognising their respective strengths and weaknesses. Within DFID it is very likely that there are similar differences based on differences in function, which effect what information is available (and its strengths and weaknesses).

3.3 Advocacy networks

Many of the most well-known successful advocacy campaigns and lobbying efforts have taken place through the means of networks of organisations, groups and individuals, each with similar and at least partially shared objectives. For example, Jubilee 2000 and the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines (ICBLM).

¹¹ It is however an issue of continuing concern to some members of the Performance Assessment Network in DFID.

Although different in structure to a large hierarchical bilateral agency like DFID these campaigns may nevertheless provide some relevant lessons. Numerous informal and semi-formal networks, many facilitated by email, exist within DFID. When it comes to working towards the objectives of an ISP at multiple levels and geographic locations within DFID network structures may be an appropriate means of making progress.

The difference between networks and hierarchies is the lack of order (stable structure) in networks, especially in terms of whose views prevail in what circumstances. In networks there is no super-ordinate authority, who aggregates all judgements. Multiple views co-exist. This is potentially a problem when it comes to making summary judgements about the effectiveness of an advocacy network.

There are however a number of possible ways forward. One is to look at the behaviour of individual members. Because membership in networks is *voluntary*, the behaviour of individual members can be treated as judgements about the current and prospective value of the network. This behaviour can include observables such as

- Changing membership numbers (growth rates, dropout rates)
- Changes in the percentage of members making observable contributions. This is easier to quantify in egroups but levels of participation are likely to be lower here than in meeting-based networking.
- Associated qualitative information:
 - What types of people have dropped out and why
 - What types of members have gained the most conspicuous influence

The second approach is to look at other more *systemic* behaviours that may be indicative of progress. For example, specialisation of roles within a network suggests some stability of views of what needs to be done and some accumulated experience in how to do different tasks.

Jordan and Tuijl (1998:11) of Novib have analysed the performance of campaigns from the perspective of NGO's political responsibilities. They have identified four types of campaigns based on different degrees of mutual accountability to members, which they label as (a) Hybrid, (b) Concurrent, (c) Disassociated, and (d) Competitive. The level of accountability present within an individual campaign was assessed by examining co-operative behaviour in three areas: (a) the objectives being pursued, (b) strategy processes, and (c) information sharing. Because the four campaign types have an explicitly ranked value they provide a basis for evaluations of campaigns (as distinct from just a categorisation). A tabulation of the four types and their attributes on each area of member behaviour can be found in Appendix C. Mutual accountability has been treated as key predictor of overall performance. The four examples of campaigns they have used suggest that this approach has some validity¹². More recently, an evaluation of the Oxfam International "Education Now" campaign has also identified the lack of mutual accountability between members of the Oxfam family as an important factor underlying many of the weaknesses noted in the campaign process.

¹² Narmada dam in India, Arun dam in Nepal, Scott Paper in Indonesia, and Conoco in Ecuador.

In their argument for this approach Jordan and Tuijl have made a number of other comments about indicative events and processes that are relevant to M&E of networks:

- "*Dividing political arenas...*Recognising who has expertise and knowledge in which political arena and respecting the boundaries established by that expertise is the first necessary act of accountability in a joint NGO advocacy effort" This relates to the significance of a specialisation of roles, already suggested above.
- "*Agenda setting and strategy building...*Agendas in advocacy will vary depending upon the objectives of each NGO. It is therefore essential to find a format to lay out explicitly what one's objectives are and then to develop a strategy with transparent goals."
- "*Information flow...* The direction in which the information flows between and among different NGOs, whether all participants in an advocacy campaign have equal access to the same information....will have a high impact on the level of accountability"
- "*Articulating information into useful forms...*A key indicator of accountability in NGO advocacy is the lengths to which NGOs will go to break through communication and language barriers"
- "*The formalisation of relationships...* As campaigns develop, relationships tend to become more formalized...Recognising and clearly establishing the parameters of mutual relationships among NGOs involved in an advocacy effort can help in defining political responsibilities, certainly if the relationships in question are expected to be productive over a longer period. The more parameters that are defined, the more explicit the level of accountability, and the better that risks can be managed"

Although coming from a political perspective Jordan and Tuijl's analysis has a strong similarity with complexity theory in its argument that the behaviour of complex entities like networks can best be analysed by looking at the prevalence of types of rules governing the behaviour of individual agents (Axlerod and Cohen, 1999). They are in effect arguing that mutual accountability rules allow the system as a whole to optimise without the use of a central decision making body which decides collective goals in advance.

A more comprehensive and in-depth examination of how networks can be evaluated should be available when DFID funded research on this topic is completed by Madeline Church of the University College London¹³.

¹³ mad@evaluation.u-net.com

3.4 Other stakeholders involved in advocacy evaluations

In Roche's (1999: 205) chapter on Impact Assessment and Advocacy he provides a tabulation of the advantages and disadvantages of what he calls the different "units of assessment" when analysing the impact of advocacy impact. This also functions as a list of likely stakeholders. The full text of the table is presented in Appendix D. The groups listed there are as follows:

- Ultimate beneficiaries at the individual and household level
- Local NGO / community based organisation / local activist groups
- Advocacy staff
- Decision makers
- Civil servants and agency staff
- Journalists
- Academics, research and policy institutes
- Public opinion

What happens in practice? The following table summarises the types of stakeholders involved in advocacy evaluations that have been identified during this review. It is not a comprehensive or systematic sample.

NGO	Campaign	Stakeholders
ADD	Advocacy in Africa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Programme Staff • Disabled People's Organisations • National Government and local council officials • Individuals associated with the influence and advocacy programme
CIIR	Drugs and Development in the Andes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Former and current CIIR staff • European NGOs • Latin American NGOs • Donors
Oxfam International	Education for All	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Oxfam staff, from more than 15 countries • Other members of the Campaign Working Group • Campaign Allies (NGOs), in seven countries • Target audiences, in three institutions • News media, both print and TV
SCF	Trade for Change campaign evaluation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SCF HQ staff • SCF Area staff • SCF Campaign supporters in the general public • Supermarkets and brand owners • Peer organisations in the same field
CAFOD	Fair Deal for the Poor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Head Office and Regional staff; • Multipliers; • Activists; • Targets; • Allies; • Gatekeepers; • Potential campaigners"
Comic Relief	Debt Wish evaluation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Broadsheet and tabloid readers C1C2 • Campaign supporters • Peer agencies (WDM, CA, Oxfam,AA) • DFID • Cabinet Ministers and MPs • Media specialists

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comic Relief staff
CAA Australia	Evaluation of CAA advocacy work	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Staff within CAA associated with the advocacy campaigns • People who were the targets of the campaigns • Interested third parties such as other NGOs or expert commentators or academics in the field concerned.

Perhaps not surprisingly, this tabulation suggests that the weakest area, in terms of stakeholder representation, may be in the inclusion of Roche's first two groups:

- Ultimate beneficiaries at the individual and household level
- Local NGO / community based organisation / local activist groups

There are other risks. A recent major evaluation of advocacy work by Oxfam also noted that "by the nature of the evaluation, we were only able to talk to advocacy targets who were interested in Oxfam (and some sympathetic to Oxfam,), even though often not in agreement". This problem is unlikely to be unique to Oxfam.

Within DFID's own attempts to assess the effectiveness of its advocacy work the challenge may be more basic, of how and when to include *any* other stakeholders outside DFID, and the targeted multilateral. DFID's immediate interest seems to be in expanding the range of bilateral donors involved promoting change within multilaterals¹⁴. NGOs are however been involved in consultations about ISP objectives.

In conclusion, it is important to note that evaluations of advocacy work are not common. In his 1999 survey of 32 Hudson (2000) found that

- 18% did "some evaluation"
- 28% did "a little"
- 54% did "practically none"

Why are there so few evaluations of advocacy work to date? An analysis of why advocacy work is not evaluated may be of help in designing incentives to ensure that advocacy work is monitored and evaluated, where intended. This issue is not taken further within this report, because there is clearly already an interest within DFID in developing capacity to assess its own influencing activities.

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¹⁴ Meeting of the Performance Assessment Network, 30th May 2001

4. What to monitor?

4.1 Objectives

Advocacy objectives need to be identified in some shape or form if the effectiveness of advocacy work is to be monitored and evaluated. Nor surprisingly, some of the problems surrounding the M&E of advocacy objectives are similar to those found in development projects.

- Poorly defined objectives. In January 2001 ADD undertook an evaluation of its advocacy and influence program in Africa. One finding was the need in some country programmes to define the objectives of advocacy work more clearly, "so as to enable adequate reporting against them on a regular basis".
- The scale of ambition involved. A CAA report notes "there is often a mismatch between actual achievements and aspirational objectives....CAA appears to often set very high expectations for relatively short term campaigns."

4.1.1 The development of objectives

The International Disability and Development Consortium (of which ADD is a member) is currently working with the European Disability Forum to develop a strategy for influencing the European Commission. The aim is to get the EC to recognise disability as a cross-cutting issue (similar to gender) to be included in all the overseas development work that it funds. Advice and collaboration is being sought from interested MEPs and EC officials.

DFID has extended consultations about its ISP throughout and beyond DFID, including members of some of the multilateral concerned. In some cases (UNIFEM) the ISP objectives are jointly agreed to. In this case the resulting ISP seems to be more about a capacity building relationship rather than an advocacy strategy.

The development of objectives is part of the advocacy process, not outside it. People and organisations are being enrolled. In the process differences are being made visible. It is quite possible that the advocate may give up more territory at this stage than anywhere else. If so then it may be more important to identify and document any reverse influencing here more than anywhere else. On the other hand, major gains may be made, simply by the scope of what has been agreed to be pursued as an objective.

4.1.2 The public nature of objectives

In contrast to most development project objectives, the objectives of advocacy initiatives are often much more public. One consequence of the public dimension of advocacy work (campaigning) is the need to make the campaign's objectives simple and tangible. SCF Forgotten Children campaign had a very specific objective, for the UK government to remove its reservation (on the rights of refugee children within the

UK) from its signature to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. An analysis of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines pointed out as one factor in its success the simplicity and concreteness of the objective as one significant factor in its success: "An international ban on the use, production, stockpiling and sale, transfer or export of antipersonnel landmines" (ICBL, 2000:4)¹⁵.

4.1.3 Time bound objectives

A number of NGO campaigns have time bound objectives. For example, both the SCF Forgotten Children campaign and Oxfam International's Education Now Campaign which had a much more complex set of objectives. Other NGOs have been involved in campaigns that have rolled on for up to a decade, or more. The campaign against Nestle being probably the most well known.

Time bound objectives have a number of advantages. One is the effect on motivation of those involved. There is a limited period of time to get things done, therefore people have to get involved (or not) sooner rather than later. The second is that time boundaries may help prevent campaign structures becoming self-perpetuating organisations. This does not always work, because sometimes re-inventions may be seen as justifiable (E.g. the Jubilee Plus continuation of Jubilee 2000). A third is that by having a definite end there is more likely to be a process of review associated with the end point. In a campaign with multiple objectives a definite end point may provide a common barrier at which the relative achievement of all objectives can be compared.

Despite the prevalence of short term campaigns in their own organisations, some NGOs argue that you need a long-term perspective to judge the effectiveness of campaigns, citing Chou En Lai's comment on the impact of the French Revolution ("It's too early to say"). However, in practice the longer a campaign goes on the more complex the overall picture becomes, in terms of documented and undocumented experience, and the more difficult it is likely to be to assess what was achieved by whom.

Another more grounded argument in favour of longer campaigns is the difference in rates of change in the south versus the north¹⁶. Alliances with southern NGO partners take longer to establish than those with northern NGO peers. Policy changes within southern government often take much longer again. This suggests that there should be some relation between the duration of a campaign and the expected rates of change in the key targets of the campaign. A standard campaign length within an organisation would therefore suggest weakness in the campaign design.

4.1.4 Responsiveness and changing objectives

Over time advocacy objectives will change. This is the case both with NGO campaigns and DFID's own ISP objectives. In the case of the revised EU ISP some of

¹⁵ Of course, simple and more concrete objectives may be easier to monitor and evaluate but that does not necessarily make them easier to achieve.

¹⁶ The opinion of an evaluator of one large NGO advocacy campaign

the additional objectives are there because of internally lobbying for their inclusion, and others are refinements of existing objectives, arising out of the last few years experience.

Many theories of organisational learning refer to "double loop learning" processes within organisations, where not only are activities adapted to improve achievement of a particular objective, but also objectives themselves are changed or adapted, to have a better fit with changed circumstances¹⁷. A narrow approach to the evaluation of advocacy achievements would focus on the former¹⁸, a wider approach would include the latter.

From an M&E perspective the question of concern here should be whether changed objectives over time represent simply a series of ad hoc changes, or informed responses representing accumulated achievements and knowledge. In his analysis of advocacy impact assessment Roche (1999:231) argues that the first step that needs to be taken is that at least *the rationale for changes in plans should be documented*. This is not yet the case with changes in individual objectives within DFID ISPs and I suspect is also not very common in the case of changing campaign priorities within NGOs. ". More recently, a similar recommendation arose out of CAA's review of its advocacy work, that "Community Aid Abroad develop a simple system to record and communicate official changes to campaign objectives and strategies.

4.1.5 Plurality of objectives

In contrast with many Logical Framework summaries of development projects advocacy efforts tend to have multiple objectives (Hudson, 2000:11). NGO advocacy campaigns with four or five objectives are common¹⁹. CAA's ADB/Mekong Campaign had 13 policy objectives outlining proposed accountability mechanisms, albeit located within a "single powerful proposition" that "The Australian government has an obligation to use the ADF replenishment process to put in place measures to improve the accountability of the ADB to its shareholders". All of DFID's ISP's also contain a large number of objectives²⁰.

A plurality of objectives is not by definition bad (e.g. because it may cause loss of focus and dispersed effort). It can also allow more buy-in to the strategy by a wider range of parties (and can be a signal of same). It can allow more flexibility of response, when conditions change and temporally block previous efforts. Having plural objectives is a form of generalism, versus single objective specialisation. The former is good for unpredictable environments, and the latter for more stable environments²¹. They can also provide more opportunities to claim success.

¹⁷ See "Contending Perspectives on Organisational Learning" at <http://www.mande.co.uk/documents/chapter4.htm>

¹⁸ For example, in an evaluation design that "sought to examine original objectives against achievements" (CAA, 2001:3)

¹⁹ Often with many sub-objectives. The Oxfam International Education Now Campaign had five main objectives but 21 sub-objectives.

²⁰ 18 in the World Bank ISP, 15 in the EIB ISP, 14 in the EBRD, 14 in the EC ISP

²¹ This argument is based on ecological theories of learning

In M&E terms having a number of objectives means more opportunities for internal comparisons of achievements. However, what does seem to be frequently missing from lists of advocacy objectives is a sense of the relative priority of those objectives. If there is a clear prioritisation then there will be a basis for subsequently weighting the achievements of different objectives. The lack of explicit prioritisation may itself be indicative of lack of a worked-through strategy. In the Oxfam Education Now campaign the importance of national level policy reform slipped down the agenda during the campaign partly by default, and partly because the links between programme and advocacy work – often played out at national level – were weak. One explanation given for this was that it reflected a lack of systematic and shared approach to power analysis within the campaign.

4.2 Program logic

4.2.1 What is it and what use is it?

Program logic is a term used in the discussion of evaluation methodology, and in the design of computer software. "A program logic model is a description of how the program works to achieve benefits for participants."²² In its simplest form a program logic is a plausible narrative, a story. Developed before the event, an explicit program logic is a form of theory of how change is expected to take place. *It helps us connect where we are now with the final objectives we are trying to achieve, discussed above.* This is potentially useful in three respects:

- To develop a realistic picture of what a program can achieve. Is the story line plausible?
- To identify what intermediate outcomes can and should be monitored. With that information we can then ask "Are things happening the way they were expected to?"
- More generally, having a theory is useful. It helps us plot our way through mountains of *potentially* useful data, that could take years to collect and look through, and focus in on that which is relevant to our expectations.

A program logic is also useful if developed, or refined after, the event. There may be a need to establish a plausible connection between our actions and the valued outcome. In Alex Bush's words "Impact assessment of advocacy is like standing in a court of law: one makes a plausible case with the aim of being believed" (HelpAged²³)

4.2.2 How are they represented?

Program logic can be explicit and implicit. Everyone involved in advocacy work is likely to have an implicit model of what they expect to happen, but not everyone necessarily has an explicit model. The level of detail in a narrative is a reasonable indicator of how explicit a model is.

²² <http://www.factsinaction.org/mcount/mcaug002.htm>

²³ Chapman and Wameyao, 2001:25

Within the NGO literature on advocacy there are a number of frameworks for thinking specifically about advocacy work. These have been summarised in the recent review by Chapman and Wamayo (2001), commissioned by ActionAid. They include some explicit *stage* models of change. Stage models provide a means of weighting evidence of achievement, as well directing searches for evidence of achievements. The achievement of the earliest stages in a process of change would normally be given less weight than the achievement in the latter stages.

The simplest stage model is that proposed by the New Economic Foundation NEF, (1998):

- Getting the issue on the agenda
- Achieving policy change (de jure)
- Achieving change in practice (de facto)

Most organisations involved in advocacy would recognise those distinctions in their own work. However, this model does not represent much progress in explicating the details of an expected course of change resulting from advocacy activities.

Oxfam's Policy Department has used a more elaborated stage model (Roche, 1999:198)

- Heightened awareness about an issue
- Contribution to debate
- Changed opinions
- Changed policy
- Policy change is implemented
- Positive change in people's lives

Another approach has been taken by advocacy evaluators like Walford (1999), who have tried, during or after the event, to explicate the various "pathways of influence" operating *specific to a campaign*. The result is in the form of a simple flow chart. The evaluator then follows each of these pathways looking for expected evidence of impact. Another important difference here is the recognition that there are *parallel* processes of influence at work over time, rather than one simple cause and effect chain. This seems one step closer to reality than the stage models above. It would be useful if Walford's method was itself more explicitly documented.

Davies (2000) has suggested a more truncated version of this approach. The suggestion is that, for reasons of economy and practicality, monitoring efforts should focus on the advocate's most immediate relationship in the chain of influence. The theory of change should identify the expected changes in that person's knowledge, which will be indicative of that person's effectiveness further down the chain. This approach is likely to be more suitable to lobbying rather than public campaigning forms of advocacy.

There are other models of expected change that argue for the importance of trying to track changes in *parallel objectives* identified as being important from the very beginning. The most common distinction is that between:

- policy impact and

- capacity building of other organisations engaged in advocacy, e.g. civil society organisations (CSOs)

The most instrumentalist argument for including the latter is that focusing on the former alone "ignores the long-term means to sustain such gains. Without strong systems or NGO/grassroots groups able to hold governments accountable, policy victories can be short lived" (Chapman and Wamayo, 2001:9). It may be worth asking whether DFID should have a similar concern about the achievements of its current ISP objectives.

On first impressions, it appears that when NGOs widen their focus to include capacity building for advocacy work the M&E of advocacy work becomes even more difficult. The setting is further afield and there is less direct control over what information is collected and analysed. However, as a recent DFID discussion on influencing noted, "A useful starting place is to use what performance information is already generated by the institution itself and work from there.". In other words, the *availability* of quality information and analysis about a CSOs' advocacy work should be one indication of the success of the capacity development assistance that has been given. A competent CSO should *know* and be able to communicate what it is doing, including its effectiveness.

Some advocacy frameworks argue that the achievement of a third parallel objective should also be of concern and monitored. IDR in the US argue that "The *democratic outcome* is the extent to which the work has opened up the channels for civil society organisations 'to be involved in decisions in the future, to create footholds that give a leg up to those who follow'" (Chapman and Wamayo, 2001:11). Others talk in similar terms of creating a "political space" (David, 1998, Chitinga and Thalman, 1997). While this may seem to be the most abstract and therefore most difficult to monitor one potentially simple indicator may simply be increased diversity of civil society organisations in existence, and the extent to which there are overt differences of views between them, and with others (Davies, 2000).

Others (David, 1999) have proposed an idealised "ladder of democratic and political space" as follows:

9. CSOs given no information about decisions or processes
8. CSOs given information on decisions taken
7. CSOs given information about decision making processes
6. Opportunities exist for a few CSOs to provide information to decision makers
5. Existence of a fora for consultation with CSOs. Decision-makers open to dissenting voices
4. Transparency and feedback from consultations
3. Evidence that CSO input is influencing policy
2. Decision-makers engage with CSOs in determining policy agenda
1. Increase range of decisions open to CSO input.

As with the other stage theories above, this ladder provides a means of sorting and weighing any evidence of change. It may also be useful as a means of describing a baseline, and then scoring progress with the first of the three objectives introduced above (policy change)

Alternatively, a wider but more explicitly political approach can be taken by using the Civil Liberties Index constructed by Freedom House in the USA²⁴ As with David's ladder it is based on the assumption of one standard being widely applicable.

There are other models of advocacy processes that differentiate events in terms of the scale on which they are taking place. IDR, USAID, NEF and Tearfund differentiate changes taking place at the level of individual, communities at the grassroots level, national level events and international events (Chapman and Wamayo, 2001). These are not really theories of change, but rather approaches to a disaggregated analysis of change (See section 5.2 below).

4.2.3 Logical Frameworks

A number of NGOs use Logical Frameworks and versions thereof to plan or at least to represent, their advocacy campaigns (e.g. MSF, CIIR, SCF, BOND). Logical Frameworks are one means of documenting the program logic. Activities take place, which via some assumptions produce outputs, which via some assumptions lead to the achievement of purposes, which via some assumptions lead to the achievement of the goal.

There are three limitations, in addition to the usual problems people encounter with the use of Logical Frameworks. One is that the stages are highly *generalised* categories of events (activities, outputs, purpose, etc), that don't reflect typical advocacy events. Secondly, the movement from narrative to assumptions column and back again does not make for easy reading to the point where implausible gaps in the story stand out. Thirdly, while there may be various parallel sequences of events, these separate channels of influence are not visible as such, because of the box structure. On the other hand, agencies like CIIR and Tearfund report that the Logical Framework has some value because it can help *integrate* their advocacy activities with other more project based capacity building activities.

As with all techniques the Logical Framework is often reinterpreted and adapted to suit local needs. Tearfund are proposing to use two additional columns: "Allies and opponents", and "Policy Targets". The former recognises that in advocacy work, more than capacity-building projects, there is likely to be significant conflict of opinion from the beginning which need to be managed. The latter seems to be a means of highlighting who is involved, more so than is visible in some descriptions of change documented in the narrative columns.

MSF Netherlands have adapted Logical Framework summaries of their projects by inserting three extra columns, detailing "Advocacy issues", separating witnessing / data collection from documentation, and "follow-up" steps to be taken. As with the Tearfund, the main use of this variation of the Logical Framework seems to be in enabling the integration of advocacy and other interventions into one schema.

²⁴ <http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2000/methodology.htm>

Other agencies have other interests in the use of the Logical Framework. CAFOD are thinking of moving towards the use of a simplified Logical Framework in order to ensure that there is ongoing monitoring, in addition to planned evaluations, and an overall perspective on the campaign, as well as detailed analyses of activities. CIIR have commented that use of the assumptions column has been of more value than the means of verification column, because it helps bring out the expectations of how the programme would work and what could cause problems.

While this is a positive example of what is often the most neglected part of Logical Frameworks (Gasper,1997) it is worth noting the observation by Leeuw (2000), working outside the field of advocacy, that "assumptional analysis as part of the Logical Framework Analysis is [supposed to be] limited to factors *outside* the scope of projects or programs. Though outside factors are important, the same is undoubtedly true for assumptions about 'inside factors' within organisations. These are not taken into account". In other words, surfacing and testing assumptions about what we think we can control may be more important than testing assumptions about what we cant control.

4.2.4 Borrowed theories

It is frequently argued (but often fruitlessly) that evaluation results should inform the planning of subsequent activities. Similarly, evaluation findings about what works and what does not work should also be able to inform how agencies then *monitor* new activities. They could be repeatedly asking "Are the previously established successes factors present or not?" I am not aware of any explicit examples of this practice, although past lessons are probably already having at least some tacit effect on what organisations decide to monitor. For this *experience-informed monitoring* to be possible NGO advocacy evaluations would need to include a "lessons learned" or "success factors" type section. Some examples have been found and some of their main lessons are given below:

<p>Land Mines campaign (Hubert, 2000)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Credibility, based on practical experience in the field, and including that of military officers. • Co-ordinated expression of one voice around the central objective, despite diversity of partners • Re-framing the issue, from military utility to humanitarian consequences • Division of labour exploiting the comparative advantages of different partners • Building support from below, enhancing consensus and enabling involvement by non-state actors • Partnerships with sympathetic states
<p>Oxfam International - Education Now</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Quality of publication outlining the main argument • Positive proposals are put forward, not just criticisms • The narrative style, between research and journalism • Media representatives providing clear and concrete messages • Timeliness of the information provided

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Broad base of sources for the information provided • Range of institutional linkages that can be called upon • Breadth of alliances and coalitions (signalling legitimacy, breadth of concern, motivating involvement, etc) • Opportunism, making best use of unexpected opportunities
CAA Australia - Advocacy review	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Single liaison person for each group of lobby targets • Ongoing consultation with govt partners about campaign process • Campaign message include recognition of positive contribution of govt partners • Arguments evidently based on research • Sharing of resources amongst NGO coalition partners • Effective hand-over arrangements when staff move on to other work
Nelson (1999) Review of NGO advocacy re the WB	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support from senior management [within WB] • Initiative by major shareholders [in WB] • Active internal leadership by individuals committed to change [within WB] • External pressure from NGOs, other observers, and the media

4.3 Process events

The distinction made in Section 2 between campaigning and lobbying suggests that there are two types of processes that can be monitored:

- Public communications
- Meeting processes

4.3.1 Public communications

Approaches to monitoring public communications vary according to objectives involved. In the simplest case, the *willingness to make a public statement* can be an important event worth noting. The 2001 ADD advocacy evaluation report noted how "The DPOs²⁵ [in Ghana] are now able to question the authorities where they feel their rights have been impinged upon". While advocacy may be about the resolution of differences an important first step in this process is simply the confidence to publicly state the nature of the differences that need to be resolved.

Another very simple and often used measure is the *volume* of media attention. NGOs like Greenpeace are well know for their use of stunts which attract media attention on an issue, but which may not in themselves have much information content about those issues (Lattimer, 1994). "Noise" helps put issues on the public agenda and can assist more substantive lobbying efforts.

²⁵ DPO being Disabled People's Organisation

Media departments of many NGOs, such as Christian Aid, will typically pay more attention to the *qualitative nature* of media coverage, taking into account:

- the status of the particular news media and programmes providing the coverage,
- the clarity of the message as communicated by the media,
- the degree of identification with the NGO,
- the degree of agreement with the message by third parties.

Third parties like the University of Wisconsin²⁶ have provided a users guide to evaluating the information provided by NGOs on their web sites, especially those with specific advocacy objectives. Their checklist also has some application to information provided through other media. The checklist consists of five main criteria, with specific questions to be asked in respect to each. The criteria are:

- Authority
- Accuracy
- Objectivity
- Currency
- Coverage

The full checklist with associated questions can be found in Appendix E. An example is available of the checklist's application to the contents of a Greenpeace website²⁷.

Further along the chain of communication, it is possible to assess the impact of these communications on their audiences. In its most systematic form this will be done through the use of contracted market research or opinion polling. Actual practice varies. Despite the scale of the Education Now Campaign market research was not used by the Oxfam affiliates participating in the campaign. On the other hand, NGOs like SCF seem to make extensive use of such research. Within the USA advocacy organisations active on domestic issues make very extensive use of opinion polling, including online polling associated with the provision of background information on the issues at stake²⁸. Despite its ease of implementation UK NGOs seem to have made very limited use of online polling²⁹.

Opinion surveys can have different functions:

- Establishing baselines, to inform the design of further public communications
- As raw material for public communications, showing the extent of support that exists for an issue
- As a means of identifying the effects of public communications to date.

In their Child Soldiers campaign SCF have used the services of BRMB International to survey public awareness and attitudes *before and after* campaign advertising. Measures included:

- Spontaneous awareness of the campaign
- Ability to recall the campaign when prompted

²⁶ <http://www.uwm.edu/letsci/edison/webevaluation/advocacy.html>

²⁷ http://husky1.stmarys.ca/~a_miller/advocacy.html

²⁸ <http://web.health.aol.thriveonline.oxygen.com/medical/powerful/issues/>

²⁹ I am not aware of any, but have not surveyed all NGO web sites. See www.mande.co.uk for an example of content preference polling

- Knowledge that SCF was associated with the campaign
- Knowledge of the core message: child soldiers are also child victims of war
- Agreement that SCF should be addressing this issue
- Willingness' to be involved through petition and postcard activities

Other agencies like Christian Aid have carried out more in-depth surveys of smaller more defined groups with closer connections, such as campaign supporters (people whose name is held in a campaign-specific mailing list). Walford and Johnston's (1994) evaluation of the Christian Aid "Trade for Change campaign included a survey of campaign supporters which monitored:

- Recall of campaign information
- Response to the information
- Motivations of those who did respond
- Multipliers (onward effects through others)
- Follow-up responses received from Christian Aid
- Supporters' socio-economic profiles

With some NGOs like ADD the task of monitoring attitude change is more challenging. Changes in public attitudes towards disability are not just a means towards an end of public policy change, but have consequences thereafter. They can have a direct and ongoing effect on people's behaviour towards people with disabilities, including *not doing* things they did before. Not only are public attitudes important, so are those of their most immediate partners, who may be locally responsible for public education activities. In the evaluation of ADD's advocacy work in Africa one of the evaluators concerns was about the absence of what they felt were appropriate attitudes towards disability *within* organisations assisting disabled people. In terms of what was discussed in section 4.2.2, they had a theory about an expected pathway of influence, and what they observed did not fit that theory.

4.3.2 Meeting processes

With lobbying activities the key events are face to face meetings, and other one-to-one communications. On the basis of information available from NGOs monitoring and reporting on this aspect of NGOs' advocacy work *seems* to be less systematic than with campaigning activities. This may be a reflection of the much less public nature of this form of advocacy and the smaller numbers of NGO staff who are normally involved. Some meetings are documented in the form of minutes, such as those between BOND members and DFID's EU Department, or of VOICE and the EU. This is not a reflection of relative diligence in monitoring, but rather one *outcome* of the advocacy process itself, an agreement on what has been agreed and disagreed.

Looking through advocacy evaluations and progress reports there are numerous references to meetings proposed, held, and planned, and their significance (CAA, CIIR, BOND, INTERACTION). Making a simple distinction between process and content, which might help weight the results is not so easy because often the content of meetings refers to further processes. E.g. ECHO agreeing to consult with NGOs when preparing its yearly strategy plan.

The following is a list of some process features that were noted as being significant in the advocacy evaluations obtained during this review:

- Willingness to meet. E.g. Australian mining companies with NGOs
- Who initiated a meeting E.g. ADB representatives sought a meeting with CAA
- The delay or speed in establishing a meeting date. VOICE noted that one outcome of their work in one country was a speed up responses to their requests for meetings with EU officials.
- The official status of the meeting.
- The status of those who attended a meeting. E.g. NGOs standing in the Dakar versus Jomtien education summits.
- The language used in a meeting.
- The roles of those attending. In its meetings with the EU VOICE wants to represent NGOs not only as parties to contracts with the EU, but also as interlocutors of the interests of others effected by the EU, especially poor communities.
- The level of trust shown within a meeting.
 - By sharing of documents and in-confidence information (BOND meetings with DFID EUD)
 - By expression of differences
- The level of confidence in participants knowledge and capacity. As shown by requests for information and advice (cited by BOND Guidance Notes)
- Whether agreements were reached or not. E.g. VOICE are still in discussions with EU over replacement of the NGO Liaison committee
- How meetings are documented. In the BOND and DFID EUD dialogue minutes now conclude with action points.
- Whether the documentation is a matter of public record or not.
- The willingness to continue the meeting process. E.g. the breakdown of discussions between NGOs and Australian mining companies was cited as a negative outcome in an evaluation of CAA's advocacy work
- Formalisation of the meeting process, if to be repeated. This being a form of transparency, involving openness about what is expected next.

It seems that there is unlikely to be any set of characteristics of meeting processes that can be generalised as an ideal and therefore used to rate progress in any particular case. However there may be arguments for emphasising some aspects of the process. One advocacy evaluation has argued that the essence of effective insider (lobbying) work is a long-term process of *trust building*. At its best this may be evident in willingness to take risks and disclose differences. However, that does not necessarily mean that substantive progress is being made towards the advocacy goals. In his analysis of NGO advocacy efforts in relation to the World Bank Nelson (1999:23) has argued that "Extensive conversations have not generally been matched by extensive revisions of policy or of practice". Instead, ""NGO pressure has helped create a culture of semi-ritualised consultations at the World Bank in which 'dialogue with stakeholders' precedes policy announcements, program initiatives, and even publications, and through which the World Bank's actions are legitimated"³⁰. This

³⁰ A number of NGO evaluations of advocacy activities have also expressed awareness about the risks of becoming too comfortable in such relationships. In CAA's advocacy evaluation one respondent commented "Dialogue is ineffectual and doesn't produce results. It is enticing, puts the NGOs at ease, and causes northern NGOs to loose touch with their field and their partners".

suggests that a more result-oriented form of relationship monitoring may be relevant, such as that tried in Ghana and Cameroon (Davies, 2000) where the focus was on documenting the *continuing emergence and resolution* of differences of opinion between parties in a relationship.

One related concern that has come up in both Oxfam and CAA evaluations has been the management of the relationship between their lobbying and campaigning activities. NGOs can find themselves in explicit confrontation with an organisation through their campaign communications at the same time as they are trying to establish and make use of trust within lobbying relationships.

4.3.3 Legitimacy

NGOs involved in advocacy work are concerned with public perceptions of their legitimacy. Legitimacy is an asset that can be built up or eroded by advocacy activities, and which in turn can effect the impact of future activities. It is a long-term process indicator, longer than the trust built up in any individual relationship between the NGO and another party.

Some proposals of how to monitor this aspect of the advocacy process have been identified. BOND provides a two-month training programme to NGOs on advocacy work. In the Guidance Notes on the monitoring and evaluation of advocacy activities they specially suggest that NGOs should monitor their *reputation*. They suggest using a small number of questions:

- Record the sources and number of inquiries that you receive as a result of your work
- Are you getting to the people you want to get to?
- How and where have they heard of your work?
- How accurate are their preconceptions about you and your work?

Lattiner (1994) has proposed that NGOs should assess their *credibility* by using a rating scale with the following components (apparently given equal weight):

Sources of organisational credibility (Lattiner, 1994, in Thomas, 1995)	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Size of membership (A/D) • Provider of good services • Links with client group (A) • Size/status of client group (A) • Links with commissioning bodies, other funding bodies, supporter or affiliated bodies (C) • Status of patrons, board members etc (C) • Links with govt, and statutory agencies (C) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Quality of research / publications/.briefings (B) • Recognised theoretical / practical expertise in a given field (B) • Age of organisation (D) • Size of organisation (D) • Wealth of organisation (D) • Efficiency of organisation • Contacts with MPs / political parties (C) • Level of positive media exposure (E) • Level of brand recognition (D)

The list is very inclusive and somewhat indiscriminating. It includes a number of different sources of credibility:

- A. Representative relationship with clients / members
- B. Expert knowledge

- C. Linkages with other credible or well-known bodies. Research on legitimacy has shown the more such linkages the higher the perceived legitimacy.
- D. Scale measures, which in the case of NGOs seems to be associated with perceived competence (Davies, 1998).
- E. Actual public judgements.

Chapman and Fisher (2000) have listed five different bases for legitimacy, and the advantages and disadvantages of using each:

- Practice-to-policy - seeking to influence policy by pointing to practical experience on the ground
- Value-based - where NGOs promote a particular value which is widely recognised within society and/or enshrined in international law.
- Knowledge and research - acting as an expert on a particular issue.
- Through grassroots and other civil society organisations - legitimise by adhering to and strengthening democratic principles and practice
- Alliances and networks - legitimacy gained from other members of network who gain legitimacy from one of the above.

Nelson (1999) has commented that "the major topics of NGO advocacy [targeted at the World Bank] can be arranged on a continuum, from those where NGOs' legitimacy is fairly widely recognised to those where establishing legitimacy is more difficult"

NGO legitimacy easily established
Development aid spending Participation in aid-financed projects Development aid sector issues Environmental impact of aid-financed projects Structural and sector adjustment programs Institutional reforms at WB/IMF: accountability, transparency Finance, investment, currency speculation, capital controls Structure of global financial architecture
NGO legitimacy more difficult to establish

Such a list provides a means of risk weighting during planning, and therefore the subsequent weighting of achievements during monitoring and evaluation.

At the edge of all such lists are the legal boundaries limiting what NGOs can and cannot do, in the UK, USA and elsewhere³¹. They legally define the legitimacy of an NGO's advocacy work.

4.5 Policy changes

4.5.1 Agreed Texts

Policy change is the core objective of all advocacy work. But what is a policy change? How can it be recognised and achievements therefore monitored and evaluated?

³¹ See for example, "Advocacy and Lobbying Without fear: What is allowed within a 5010(c) (3) Charitable Organization" at www.nonprofitquarterly.org/advocacy/raffa.htm

In law policies can exist in more than one form, as³²:

- a rule or regulation promulgated, adopted, or ratified by a legislative body, or
- a policy statement or decision that is officially made by an official. or
- a custom that is a permanent, widespread, well-settled practice that constitutes a standard operating procedure, or
- an act or omission ratified by a lawmaking officer or policy-making official.

These forms of policy change seem to vary on a number of attributes which may be relevant to M&E of policy change: (a) the level of authority involved, (b) how explicitly the policy is stated, and (c) how publicly the policy decision is documented.

At the international level there is an additional variable. In Oxfam International's Education Now Campaign the *number* as well as the status of national and international endorsements of policy proposals like the Global Action Plan were documented.

In practice NGO advocacy work involves a wide variety of forms of policy change. Those being pursued by a sample of the larger international development NGOs in the UK are listed below³³.

Target	Type of policy change
Multilaterals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy on debt repayment obligations (WB, IMF) • Transparency of decision making process (WTO) • Primary objectives (WTO poverty focus)
Country groupings (e.g. G8)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitoring of global progress according to targets (education) • Targets for aid transfers (education) • Limits on scale of debt repayments (% of GNP) • Agenda of meetings (debt cancellation) • Eligibility definitions (HIPC, for debt cancellation)
Single governments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Application of US patent laws (re GM variants of food crops) • Legislation (control of export of small arms, sex offences overseas) • Administrative practice (use of voucher system by refugees) • Conditionalities on international conventions (UK on UN Rights of the Child)
Companies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy on drug pricing (HIV, Malaria drugs) • Progress reporting on cost reduction strategy (of drugs) • Donations to research on disease effecting poor people • Voluntary code of conduct (re sources of supplies, labour codes) • Independent monitoring (of adherence to the code)
Political parties	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contents of party manifestos (in the 2001 election)

There are different ways of categorising or differentiating these types of policy change. At a very simple level there seems to be a differences in detail, in the extent to which they *specify* what is to be done.

- Some are about the policy making process E.g. agenda contents, transparent process.
- Some are about specific objectives
- Some include budgets

³² "Legal Definition of Official Policy", in the USA, at <http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/o013.htm>

³³ Oxfam, ActionAid, SCF, Christian Aid, CAFOD.

- Some specify means of implementation
- Some refer to monitoring of results
- And even independent verification of results

In his review of NGO advocacy efforts in relation to the World Bank Nelson (1999:1) differentiated NGO advocacy efforts in terms of *the stages of the policy making process* they attended to, and emphasised the importance of covering all stages. "These interventions have focused heavily, but not exclusively, on the early stages of the policy process, i.e. on putting issues on the agenda and framing the outlines of policy". "...the focus on the agenda formation has sometimes meant that NGOs are so pleased to have an issue accepted as legitimate and addressed by government and the IFIs that they don't give adequate attention to the hard work of monitoring policy implementation"

In a similar review of NGO attempts to influence the World Bank, Brown and Fox (1999) have differentiated NGO advocacy efforts more in terms of *levels*, rather than stage. They distinguished attempts to influence specific development *projects* e.g. a dam, and efforts to shape development *policies* on critical issues e.g. rights of indigenous peoples, water resources management. There is some overlap here with the four types of policy, as legally defined above, with the last two being more similar to the project level and the first two relating more to policy, in its narrow definition.

In practice NGOs can aim at both types of change within the one campaign. CAA's Mining campaign in the late 1990s focused both on the behaviour of Australian mining companies in Indonesia, and on the improvement of a codes of practice concerning the social impact of mining proposed by the Minerals Council of Australia. However, the evaluators noted a shift during the campaign from a focus on specific mines to mining in general and from changes by individual companies to legislative change. The latter was a direct result of problems obtaining desired changes in the code of conduct proposed by the industry.

4.5.2 Budgets and Expenditure

Budgets are a particularly important type of policy statement. In India an advocacy network known as Peoples's BIAS³⁴ has argued that budgets are "the most solid expression of the government's priorities, performances, decisions and intentions"

Two types of change have been sought by various advocacy efforts. The most common are changes in *budget allocations*. For example, the percentages of national aid budgets allocated to education activities (Education Now campaign), and the allocation of aid funds within the EC development budget, towards poorer countries (a DFID concern)³⁵. Or in the case of the CIIR East Timor campaign, the concern may be negative *expenditure* indicators: the scale of UK and Australian development assistance to the Indonesian government in the 1990s. Less common have been attempts at changing the *budgetary process*, and the management of finances more generally.

³⁴ http://www.ncasindia.org/ncas_advocacyperspective_new.htm

³⁵ In 1996/7 Morocco received the highest amount of any recipient country

In developed economies monitoring budget allocations is not difficult, but the same is not the case with many developing economies. In India People's BIAS have been focused not on altering budget allocations, but simply on improving the *public accessibility* of budget information. This is a precondition for effective advocacy around the allocations made within the budget.

While changes in allocations can easily be quantified in countries where budgets are accessible, those changes still need to be seen *in context*. In the Education Now Campaign CAA called upon the Australian government to allocate a minimum of 8% of the AusAid budget to basic education assistance. Allocations to basic education prior to the budget was less than 3% of the overall aid budget, but this was increased up to 5% in the budget that followed the campaign. The significance of this development could have been clarified by including the following contextual information:

- What other lower priority areas received higher increases if any? (More significant if none at all)
- Was the increase at the expense of cuts to any other higher priority areas? (More significant if not)
- How much did the overall aid budget go up? (More significant if less, or none or negative.)
- And how much did the overall government budget go up? (More significant if less, none or negative)

Questions like these could be used as the basis for constructing a performance score card, as described in the Center for Democracy and Governance's Handbook on Democracy and Governance Programme Indicators³⁶

4.6 Implementation of changed policies

This seems to be the weaker side of NGO advocacy work. Most campaigning objectives are focused on policy change, which is reasonably assumed to be of benefit to disadvantaged groups if properly implemented. There are at least three approaches to monitoring implementation.

The first is doing *direct follow-up* work to see if policy changes have made a difference to practice. For example, whether any sections of the Global View Manifesto which have been incorporated into party manifestos have actually been acted upon in any way. In this case it appears there are no plans for such follow up, because the campaign is scheduled to end shortly after the 2001 elections. In other cases, like SCF's Forgotten Children campaign³⁷ it is more likely, though not specifically planned at present, that SCF will go on to inquire about implementation if the policy change is achieved. Both are *feasible* because the campaign targets are within the UK, but only in one case is the extra work seen as *appropriate*.

³⁶ <http://www.usaid.gov/democracy/techpubs/indicators/appcd4.html>

³⁷ Aimed at removing the UK government's right to discriminate against refugee children within the UK, claimed in its 1991 Reservation to its signature on the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child

The second approach is to include within the text of a proposed policy change a commitment by the implementing body to *report on progress* with implementation and even the impact of those changes. Oxfam's Cut the Cost³⁸ campaign calls on Glaxo Smith Kline not only to develop a cost reduction strategy, but also to provide annual reporting on its implementation. In CAA's Asian Development Bank & Mekong campaign they not only sought a commitment to greater poverty focus in ADB projects but also periodic reporting on the implementation of this policy focus (improved poverty focus), and transparency of procedures for implementing a policy change implemented.

The third approach has been to include within the text of a proposed policy change an agreement to allow *independent monitoring*. These are more common in advocacy campaigns directed at companies than governments or multilateral bodies. Companies who have joined the Ethical Trade Initiative not only have to provide progress reports with implementation of the "Base Code", but are also expected to be open to independent verification visits, and to be willing to participate in sector specific studies of labour practices. CAA's Mining campaign included proposals for independent monitoring of companies' commitment to undertaking social impact assessments.

These strategies vary in the scale of time and money invested in monitoring implementation of policy, and who carries these costs. What is the significance of this difference?

- To the extent that the target organisation agrees to carry the costs it suggests that the advocacy has been quite successful to date, signalling a high likelihood of actual implementation.
- The same might also be the case when the advocate is willing to accept independent monitoring, as a back up to self-reporting by the target.

The significance of low levels of investment may be less clear, signalling either poorly planned advocacy or low expectations.

4.7 Changes in people's lives

There are relatively few advocacy campaigns that have developed their own independent procedures for assessing the impact of specific policy changes they have been advocating, at the level of poor communities in developing economies. The best developed seem to be those by the Ethical Trading Initiative. These include the use local communities in the monitoring and verification of codes of conduct by local employers³⁹. Any such efforts have costs and therefore implications for sustainability. In parallel with enabling local community involvement the Ethical Trading Initiative has also invested in developing suppliers' own internal capacity to monitor outcomes, both as a means of increasing ownership of standards enforcement and as a way of managing the costs and complexity of the task.

³⁸ Of essential drugs used by poor communities, especially for HIV and malaria.

³⁹ http://www.ethicaltrade.org/html/events/seminar_02/framesets/f_page.shtml

More often development NGOs will use their own presence, or that of their partners, in effected countries to gather information about the existence and impact of policy changes. Amongst the NGOs contacted there has been general trend towards greater integration of southern project based work and often northern-based policy advocacy activities, enabling more effective monitoring through these channels. Where NGOs have invested heavily into the impact of policies it has generally been directed towards the impact of polices that may need to be changed, for example SCF's research into cost-sharing policies in the health sector.

The improved ability to gain access to information about policy impact in normally difficult circumstances can itself be an important indication of impact. CIIR's review of advocacy in relation to East Timor commented on the importance of the fact that the Government of Indonesia accepted investigations into the Santa Cruz massacre in East Timor.

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5. Collection and analysis

5.1 Collection

5.1.1 Baselines

There is little evident enthusiasm for the establishment of baselines in advocacy work, in the few guides that are available. Neither the BOND Guidance Notes nor the Tearfund Advocacy Study pack make any reference to their use. In the Education Now campaign plans were made, but not followed through. Even in conventional development projects baseline data collection can be very arduous and time consuming, especially if there is no clear idea of what needs to be documented. This is more likely to be the case when objectives are poorly defined and where the program logic leading to their achievement is not that clear. Having a clear hypothesis makes data collection much easier. However, in advocacy projects there is the added complication of plural objectives and changing objectives over time, already noted in section 4.1 above.

Roche's (1999) book on impact assessment provides some useful lessons on baseline collection but his main thrust is to argue that "*the monitoring of ongoing change in the relationship between outputs and impact is likely to be more useful than extensive before and after surveys. This suggests a greater emphasis on systematically recording ongoing evidence (both anecdotal and statistical) and making a reasoned assessment of past impact on a regular basis than on collecting data on a large number of predetermined indicators*" (Roche, 1999:209).

The experience of Oxfam, CIIR and others suggests that the problem is not one of baseline data as such, but rather the lack of *historical* data describing what has happened over the duration of an advocacy campaign. In one evaluation 50 questionnaires were sent out but only two responses were received, even after a telephone follow up. One of the reasons being that most people who were familiar with the project had left and were difficult to trace. This is especially problematic in review of long term campaigns such as CIIR work on the EC drugs policy in Latin America, which covered the years from 1990-2000.

The Bond Guidance Notes take a similar line to Oxfam. They argue that "*the best attempts are likely to involve you collecting whatever information you can as you go along - orally, scribbling down notes and filing them, talking into a tape etc, so you have evidence to back up your arguments and or hunches when you need to. **The onus should be on doing it rather than worrying about it***"

When is detailed baseline data collection really necessary? One deciding factor is likely to be the visibility of the expected change. Change in a specific government policies should be evident if it they of any value. One the other hand, changes in public opinion will not be readily evident, and may need opinion polls surveying before and after interventions. As noted above, SCF UK have made repeated use of opinion poll surveys in their campaign work

5.1.2 Surveys and sampling

In section 3.4 above a table was provided listing the types of stakeholders interviewed in the course of advocacy evaluations. In all of these evaluations, and others, there is a sampling process of some sort, but they vary in how systematic and structured they are. The most systematic seem to be the market research surveys used to assess the impact of various media messages. One difficult to avoid bias has already been noted, that of focusing on people who are available in the country undertaking the advocacy, versus those overseas, especially in poor communities in poor countries effected by the policies under discussion. Another bias has been noted by Oxfam and CAA evaluations, and quite likely by others as well. This is the bias towards those who are available and wanting to talk to the evaluators. Those most likely to have a critical view of the advocacy activities are often those least likely to want to talk to someone hired by the NGO concerned. In some cases an NGO has warned evaluators not to talk to such people, possibly for fear of further negative repercussions for the campaign.

In these circumstances the least that evaluators could do would be to list not all those that they talked to, but also those they tried to contact and could not talk to, with reasons for the latter, where known. This information is present in some evaluations, but would be more helpful if tabulated in the methodology section.

Another way of coping with bias and hostility is to distance the survey process from a specific campaign or NGO. Rees (1998) survey of "Effective Nonprofit Advocacy" in the USA was commissioned by the Aspen Institute, which does not engage in advocacy work. Her survey did not focus on a single advocacy theme or type of organisation, but on an open ended class of non-profit organisations "that you believe have the most influence on federal policy". She was able to identify the legislators' views of the most effective organisations and the specific attributes contributing to that success.

5.2 Analysis

5.2.1 Disaggregation

As noted above, IDR, USAID, and NEF all argue the need to differentiate changes taking place at different levels (Chapman and Wamayo, 2001).. NEF differentiates the grassroots, national and international level, with three to five sub-groups within each level. IDR differentiates policy changes taking place at provincial, local, provisional, national government and international agency levels. In practice it appears that few NGOs evaluate their advocacy campaigns on such a structured and thorough basis.

Within large transitional campaigns such as Education Now there were activities taking place in a number of countries at the same time. Information was collected and tabulated on achievements in each country, but this was not accompanied by an analysis of the differences in achievements across countries. The primary constraint on this sort of analysis was time, and the pressure for results that could be of immediate value in informing the next campaign. There was a demand for lessons that could be learned, but not it seems at the country level of analysis.

5.2.2 Aggregation

Large-scale campaigns involving multiple objectives and many actors, such as the Oxfam International Education Now campaign present major problems when it comes to aggregating data. Even though there were a number of objectives with quantitative objectives there were still problems. Information was missing for some countries and the measures used, or way in which results were described varied. Clear tabulation of the constituent data is one response. The other, used by the campaign evaluations, was to interview others about their interpretations of the data. This was appropriate for two reasons:

- All data needs interpretation, and it is the interpretations that count. The main actors' interpretations are likely to be influential on a day to day basis than the initial interpretations of the evaluators.
- Some of the quantitative figures were about commitments and budgets, rather than actual expenditures, so they still had an element of uncertainty about them that needed to be taken into account.

Large scale also affects turn-around time, between end of a campaign, its evaluation and when the lessons from that evaluation can be applied to the next campaign, or next phase of the previous one. The depth of the Oxfam International evaluation was limited because of the need within Oxfam International for information that would inform the next stage of that campaign.

5.2.3 Changes over time

There are two methods used to represent the course of an advocacy campaign. The simplest and most common is a simple narrative, as used by CIIR to tell the story of their programme on "Drugs and Development in the Andean region", from 1990 to 2000. The alternative is to use a graphical device, such as a timeline. The latter has been used by a number of NGOs to describe different aspects of a campaign at the same time. ActionAid's timeline of its London based advocacy work on DFID humanitarian policies in Sierra Leone differentiated (a) London events, (b) Inter-agency work in the UK, (c) Objectives and positioning. Chapman and Fisher's (1999:13) timeline of advocacy activity in relation to the carpet industry in India differentiated: (a) Actions by NGOs, (b) Support mechanisms (aiding achievement of objectives), and (c) Hindering factors (limiting achievements). Oxfam's (Roche,1999:223) timeline of Oxfam's campaign on debt 1993-99 differentiated: (a) Oxfam campaign outputs, and (b) Outcomes / effects / impact.

Two of these have also used arrow lines to show perceived causal links between the various events. The complex *net* of interactions that results looks more like real life, but at the cost of being somewhat more difficult to read. This sort of trade off between reality and readability is a basic problem, noted by Sutton (1999) in her review of the policy process. The reality is that many policies are the result of "a chaos of purposes and accidents" but policy makers and their lobbyists need simplifying narratives.

5.2.4 Managing conflicting views

"To get an overview of how successful you were you need to solicit the views of a range of stakeholders i.e. ultimate beneficiaries, local people and their organisations, staff involved, target audience, journalists and outsiders" (BOND Guidance notes). This could be described as a consensualist approach. The more agreement amongst the more groups, the stronger the conclusions. CAA⁴⁰ and Oxfam evaluations followed a similar approach, looking for areas where there was agreement on advocacy impact.

While this is understandable as a means of constructing generalisations it may not be quite the balanced approach it seems. Many of the disagreements between stakeholders over the interpretation of events that took place could have as much consequence as the areas of agreement. In terms of the design of future advocacy work they may be even more important than the areas of agreement.

It is also the case that there are plenty of circumstances where development may involve a non-zero-sum game, where someone has to lose out, and broad agreement on the significance of the results will not be possible. This is especially the case where the use of limited resources is at stake, such as organisational budgets.

The proposal to use a consensual approach may also signal confusion about who the intended clients are for the advocacy work. Whose welfare is of highest priority? If the answer to that question is well known from the beginning then the opinions of different groups on the results of advocacy work can be weighted, or even discounted, accordingly.

It is not uncommon for advocacy projects to have multiple client groups, who are expected to benefit from effective advocacy work. The CAA ADB/Mekong Campaign was based on concerns about the lives of peoples in the Mekong delta, but also about the proper use of Australian taxpayers money used to fund projects in that area. The interests of the former were of highest concern, but meeting the interests of the second was essential to the success of the campaign. How much weight is put on the judgements of each party depends on the strategy itself, where was most change desired.


One approach to the analysis of success was identified which takes a constructive approach to differences of opinion between stakeholders. In Oxfam International's evaluation of their Education Now Campaign (2000-2001) one section examines "key determinants of success" Approximately 20 different determinants were identified. These were then given an importance rating (1-3) and an achievement ranking (1-5) by the group which led the campaign. The achievement ratings were sought from other stakeholders and two categories of external stakeholders (multilaterals target audiences, and campaign allies). "The expectation was that main learning would come from observing *differences* in perception of performance between the Campaign Working Group and other stakeholders."

⁴⁰ The CAA report noted that "in general assessments were only accepted if validated by at least two others or by documentary evidence"

5.2.5 Cost effectiveness and efficiency

Many NGOs involved in advocacy would agree with Roche's (1999:193) comment that "NGOs need to demonstrate that their advocacy is not only effective but also cost-effective...". In practice this form of assessment is uncommon enough in conventional development projects, let alone advocacy activities. The most common cause of the problem is not lack of appropriate methods of analysing cost-effectiveness and efficiency, but something more basic. This is the lack of readily available information about the costs of different activities within a project, couched in units that can then be assessed in term of their success. This is even more problematic with advocacy activities that may involve multiple sections with a NGO's head office and field offices. The absence of quantitative data about inputs and their costs was noted in the ADD and Oxfam advocacy evaluations, and is unlikely to be unique to those organisations alone.

At a more macro level some NGOs have been able to draw some conclusions, which may help point the way forward. In their Education Now campaign CAA noted that "Objective 4 has been less than effective [compared to the other objectives] with considerably fewer resources being allocated to address to national policy reforms" Two measures have been related: relative achievements compared to relative costs. This enables a statement to be made about *relative* cost effectiveness. If this poor level of effectiveness was associated with an average or above average allocation of campaign resources the overall result would have been a lower level of [relative] cost effectiveness. Using ranking judgements alone it can be possible to plot actual distributions against an ideal, note the scale of the difference and explore the reason for the outliers. The following graph is a example.



5.2.6 Attribution problems

The difficulty of attributing specific causes to observed changes is widely recognised as a problem by the NGOs contacted during this review, and within DFID. Everybody recognises that there is often a multiplicity of actors engaged in any issue, with many independent, conflicting and co-operative interests.

NGO and DFID concerns about the difficulties of attribution are not simply academic concerns that can be ignored. They are specifically concerned about how to identify the effects of their own actions. Within their own organisations (and in their relations to other funding sources) the ability to make credible claims of effect can effect the status and legitimacy of their work, and perhaps most importantly, their future access to financial resources⁴¹. "Agencies would like to allocate their resources on the basis of what works" says Roche. The problem is how to make claims of effect that are well founded and not manifestly biased by the self-interest in the right judgement being made.

Outside their organisations the ability to make such claims is generally recognised as being problematic for different reasons. Claims to have been the prime mover behind an important change can create annoyance and dissatisfaction amongst allies and undermine the solidarity for further joint work. In the worst case such claims could de-legitimise the case for a change, where that case is based on a popular mandate for change, rather than expert knowledge.

One response to the problem of internal bias is to contract out evaluations of advocacy work. Most of the NGOs contacted who have undertaken evaluations have used outside evaluators. Most of these evaluations have made a deliberate attempt to consult a wide range of stakeholders, but the time available to do so, and then synthesise the results is necessarily limited. Perhaps more significantly, those evaluations are not always put in the public domain, or advertised as being available, if they are.

More prolonged and systematic public exposure of evaluation findings on advocacy work may be one means of tempering the inclination to make sympathetic claims of effectiveness for internal reasons. This process could be seen as a form of post-evaluation "triangulation", in contrast to that undertaken during the evaluation process.

One could go further and ask whether the proportion of non-public evaluations (which do exist in a number of NGOs) is a crude indicator of lack of effectiveness. The argument being that they are being withheld either because they contain too much information about poor performance or make claims that are unlikely to be publicly credible, or that the evaluation process itself was below expectations.

There are other possible ways of tackling the problem of attribution, which can be undertaken *within* an advocacy organisation. Oxfam staff have in the past ranked eleven of their advocacy campaigns in terms of the "level of certainty of attributing

⁴¹ Amongst many NGOs the sections devoted specially to advocacy work have had led a precarious existence over the years, relative to those concerned with project funding or fundraising.

change to Oxfam", and then plotted these measures against a ranking of the known (relative) impact of these campaigns (Roche, 1999:211). This approach recognises that within organisations there can be a substantial amount of informal and tacit knowledge about how much they have contributed to a particular change, relative to others, and relative to other changes.

Dismissing that knowledge because of its subjectivity is effectively making the best the enemy of the good. Subjectivity can be managed in a similar way to that suggested above. Roche suggests that "*It would then be interesting to compare and contrast the views of various agencies involved in the same campaigns to corroborate or contest these findings*". This comparison would be value if the reasons for differences in the ranked position of different campaigns were made clear, and not just their rank order.

The graphing of the results has a further advantage not pointed out by Roche. We can think about the ideal outcome and compare this against the actual. Ideally, the highest level of certainty about attribution would be associated with campaigns that were the most successful in impact terms. In practice, the Oxfam graph suggested a slightly inverse relationship, where certainty was greater with those campaigns with lower levels of impact.

The most evident problem with NGO claims to effectiveness of their advocacy work is not the lack of sophisticated methodology for analysing attribution, but simply one of *decontextualised reporting*. Most of the narrative accounts of advocacy campaigns focus, perhaps understandably, on the actions taken by the NGO and the outcomes that have been achieved. For example, certain key phrases being included in the text of an agreement or policy statement. What is typically missing is attention to the negative changes or no-occurrence of expected changes, and to what other organisations managed to achieve and not achieve. This is very evident in Oxfam's otherwise very useful timeline describing its campaign on debt from 1993-99 (Roche, 1999:223).

In philosophy "truth tables" are a means of representing the combination of all logical possibilities. A similar device may be of use in the evaluation of advocacy work, to ensure more balanced and contextualised reporting. The following table includes four possible outcomes of negotiations over an official text (e.g. a party policy or conference statement). The outcomes are the types of texts that were and were not included in the final version (or, in summary, the most significant example of each type of texts).

	The NGO advocate	Other advocates
Texts included	A	B
Texts not included	C	D

As with scorecards, it may be possible to identify an ideal set of outcomes, against which the actual outcomes can be compared. The ideal might be that that all the NGOs changes are in A cell, and all the others are in D. The worst case would be the

reverse⁴². A neutral outcome would be for changes to be equally distributed in all four cells. One possibly constructive consequence of the use of such a reporting format would be more attention to sources of influence outside the NGO itself.

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⁴² Assuming in this case no coalition of interest with the other advocates

6. Next steps

6.1 Distribution

The intention is that that a draft of this document will be circulated within DFID for comment, with a view to identifying any areas which have been neglected or need to be covered in more depth, in order to make the review more useful.

NGOs which have contributed documents and opinions on the monitoring and evaluation of advocacy have also expressed an interest in being provided copies of the report.

6.2 Further inquiries or application?

This review has been undertaken over a span of five working weeks. Contact has been made with more than 40 organisations, documents and information have been provided by a subset of these, and interviews by a smaller subset still. The evidence that has been collated represents the tip of a large iceberg, only part of which is formally documented and only part of that is available to outsiders, and often only after some effort. As noted at the beginning a wide range of NGOs are active in advocacy work, including those engaged in environmental issues, human rights and development programmes. This review is far from being complete.

There are two possible ways forward for DFID as the immediate client of this work:

- The first is to look inward, within DFID and ask how the issues and methods discussed within this review could be related to the tasks of monitoring and evaluation of ISP objectives within DFID, if and where there was a demand for such advice.
- The second is to consider how the contents of this review could be selectively developed in more detail, with a focus on areas of particular relevance to DFID. I have outlined below four different directions, with some subsidiary options under each of these.

1. Look further at the behaviour of NGOs

- Explore a *holistic* view of advocacy as practised by one UK NGO
- Investigate *lobbying* methods and strategies used by NGOs, rather than the more public campaigning dimension of advocacy.
- Explore *southern* NGOs approaches to advocacy work in relation to the activities of multilaterals within their countries. E.g. CEE Bankwatch

2. Look at the responses of the targets of NGO advocacy efforts.

- The *EC's* reactions to being the target of NGO advocacy activities.
- *DFID's* own experience of being influenced by the World Bank

3. Look at how bilateral agencies are monitoring and evaluating their

advocacy efforts.

- Identify the commonalities and differences in their approach to influencing multilateral agencies, compared to DFID and NGOs.

4. Pay more attention to particular method issues

- How to identify and represent the program logic of advocacy initiatives
- Identifying theories of the policy making (and implementing) process that could help guide monitoring efforts.
- Methods of process documentation of advocacy activities
- Mechanisms for enabling advocacy agents to be accountable, to their clients (poor communities) and other stakeholders.
- Establish a bibliography of all known NGO advocacy evaluations in the UK, in order to get better access to evaluation methodologies.

6.3 Afterword

On Tuesday 7th August a summary presentation of this report was made to an audience approximately 45 DFID staff in London. The contents of that presentation can be found in Appendix G

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Appendix A: Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference:

How to Evaluate the Effectiveness of DFID's Influence with Multilaterals

1. Purpose

1.1 In 1999, it was agreed that DFID's performance assessment system for both internal management and external reporting purposes needed strengthening. In the process of reviewing the current system several weaknesses were identified. One important factor in making the Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) system work well is the need to assess the effectiveness of DFID's work and influence with other development actors especially large multilateral donors. Without assessing these activities, no solid conclusions can be drawn on CSP performance.

1.2 Influencing is high on the agenda in EEWHD. In our two biggest partner countries, Russia and Brazil, DFID can only play a small bilateral role compared to the EC, World Bank, and Regional Development Banks (EBRD, IDB, CDB, and ADB). Our focus on poverty reduction as the goal has to be approached through multilateral and policy influencing work. The Summary Paper on Middle Income Countries (MICs) states that influencing should be a core business for departments in DFID dealing with MICs.

1.3 This study aims at suggesting methodologies of evaluating the effectiveness of DFID's work with multilateral donors. The study should also provide lessons learned from other small bilateral donors and NGOs. The objective is to facilitate the Country Performance Review Process and to improve our influencing performance.

2. Background

2.1 In her introduction to the 1997 White Paper, the Secretary of State wrote: "This White Paper commits Britain to using its influence directly and in collaboration with others to mobilise a much stronger international commitment to poverty eradication." Since DFID cannot have bilateral programmes everywhere, we have to use our influence in multilateral development institutions to achieve this aim. 50% of DFID's total programme budget went to multilateral development agencies in 1998-99, but only 4.2% of DFID's running costs went on influencing how this money was spent.

2.2 The multilateral development institutions make a unique contribution to development, not only through the scale of their resources but also through the influence they can exercise over policies of partner governments. DFID is committed to further encourage multilateral development institutions not only to strengthen their commitment to poverty elimination, but also to devote more attention to evaluating and monitoring the output of their activities. To achieve these aims, DFID has to increase its efforts and shift human resources into broader policy influencing work and assessing its effectiveness.

2.3 More concretely, departments have to develop strategies for working with the relevant multilateral institutions in their regions. EECAD's and CSEED's main partners are the EC and the World Bank. For LACAD, the IDB plays a significant role. EECAD has already written a strategy paper for working with multilaterals in general. CSEED has developed an influencing agenda for the EU and is working increasingly with the World Bank on poverty and social policy agendas as well as the EBRD. It is drawing up a broader influencing strategy for the World Bank and EBRD. Influencing objectives are also set out in individual country strategy papers. LACAD has recently set up a working group on influencing. In all three departments, influencing is still primarily an ad-hoc activity up to individuals. There is not much concerted effort towards a common goal and influencing activities are not well documented.

2.4 To facilitate the process of developing coherent influencing strategies and to assess the extent and current evaluability of influencing, the RPU chaired an informal meeting where departments can exchange best practice experience.

3. Rationale for consultancy

3.1 The RPU has identified the need to collect and review a significant amount of literature on evaluation methodologies and practice, and come up with recommendations for EEWH departments. This would go beyond the capacity and expertise of the Regional Policy Unit or WHEED. We therefore recommend that consultants with wide experience in both private sector and donor evaluation methodologies undertake the study.

4. Specific tasks for consultancy

4.1 In the first phase of the project, the consultants will be briefed by the RPU on current influencing strategies in DFID. They will also talk to the evaluation department and EEWH departments about the DFID evaluation process (indicators, success criteria, etc.). The consultant will liaise with the consultant contracted to undertake the private sector part of the work. The consultants should become familiar with PRISM. Specifically, the consultants will then:

- review recent literature on policy dialogue effectiveness and aid co-ordination, and
- obtain information on best practice on evaluating influencing activities in NGOs . This could be extended to a bilateral donor (in the second part) if one with appropriate evaluative criteria is identified by the consultant.
- approach organisations working in Western Hemisphere and/or Eastern Europe that DFID is trying to influence to obtain a view on what, in their opinion, the indicators of successful influencing are (quantitative, e.g. number of contacts, visits, and qualitative indicators).

4.2 In the second phase, after consultation with the RPU, the consultants will:

- produce recommendations for DFID on how to evaluate influencing.

- advise on potential methodologies for evaluation including objectives, baseline, inputs, time frame, process indicators and success criteria.

5. Key deliverables and timing

5.1 The study will consist of two parts of three weeks each. The commissioning of the second part of the study will be dependent on the consultants identifying potentially useful aspects of influencing evaluation that could be appropriate for DFID. Starting date will be the beginning of April.

5.2 Initial report after three weeks to RPU. Best practice and recommendations for DFID will be submitted within three weeks of commissioning second part of the project start. The study will be circulated in EEWHD for two weeks. The consultants will then give a presentation of the main findings to EEWHD.

6. Logistics

6.1 It is envisaged that the majority of research will be London based. However, there will be provision in the second half of the consultancy for one visit to a similar size donor organisation (governmental or non-governmental), if the consultants identify one with particular relevant experience.

7. Reporting

7.1 The consultants will report to the Regional Policy Unit after the initial part has been completed.

8. Consultants: Required skills and experience

8.1 Wide experience in evaluating aid effectiveness; Expertise in developing methodologies for project and programme assessment; Knowledge of impact assessment practices of bilateral donors and NGOs; In-depth knowledge of multilateral agencies policy making process; Knowledge of EC, WB and RDBs policies and operations; Knowledge of DFID and ability to write documents according to DFID standards; Good communication and interpersonal skills;

Regional Policy Unit, WHEED
Department for International Development

Appendix B: Key questions for assessing advocacy work with clients and audiences

From Roche (1999:232). Also in Chapman and Wameyo (2001:23), and BOND

Audience	Client
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who was supposed to hear the message? • Who has heard the message? • How did they interpret the message? • How was it different from other messages? • What did they do in response? • Have they heard of the sender/advocate? • How do they differentiate the sender/advocate from others who might be communicating similar messages? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If clients are not already working with the NGO how are they contacted in order to ensure that the NGO is acting appropriately on their behalf? • To what extent have NGOs shared their advocacy activities with the people they are working with? • Has there been any attempt to get beneficiaries to rank advocacy work against other activities which they may see as more relevant? • What effort has there been to provide feedback to intended beneficiaries about the results of advocacy work • To what extent do beneficiaries feel more confident about their capacity to advocate on their own behalf? • What effort has been made to seek people's assessments of results and get their confirmation of assumed impact?

Appendix C: A Typology of Campaigns

From: Jordan and Tuijl, (1998) *Political Responsibility In NGO Advocacy. Exploring Emerging Shapes In Global Democracy*. Novib. Netherlands.

<http://www.oneworld.org/euforic/novib/novib1.htm>

Campaign types				
	Hybrid	Concurrent	Disassociated	Competitive
Objectives	Interlocking	Compatible	Conflicting	Opposing
Information	High frequency, Global distribution Easily accessible, Freely shared	Regular, Multi-phased, More tightly directed, Freely shared	Infrequent, Lopsided, Difficult to access, Shared with reservation	Minimal, No direct flow, Inaccessible, Not shared
Strategy	Continuous review, Joint management, Risks based upon most vulnerable	Frequent review, Coexisting management, Risks based upon national arena	Occasional review, Management and risks exclusive to varying arenas	No review, Separate management, No recognition of risks
Accountability	High	Medium	Low	None

Appendix D: Different units of assessment for impact assessment of advocacy work

(And a Typology Of Stakeholders In The Evaluation Of Advocacy)

From: Roche, C. (1999) *Impact Assessment for Development Agencies: Learning to Value Change*. Oxfam. Oxford.

Unit of Assessment	Advantages	Disadvantages
Ultimate 'beneficiaries', individual and household level	Permits understanding of : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ultimate impacts and changes in people's lives • capacity for collective action and advocacy • sustainability of impacts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • May be difficult to link changes to advocacy outputs • May ignore other influences • May be difficult to aggregate impacts
CBO/ Local NGO/local activist groups	Permits understanding of : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • capacity for collective action and advocacy • capacity to support and sustain changes at individual level • space created for advocacy • impact of advocacy on community norms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exact membership sometimes difficult to assess • Within and between group dynamics often difficult to understand • Difficult to compare using quantitative data
Advocacy staff	Permits understanding of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • input and outputs to the advocacy process • perceived models and indicators of change as well as strategies to achieve it • comparison of different agencies' roles 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tendency to exaggerate their role, often for their own organisational survival • May be divorced from others in the organisation working with local actors
Decision-makers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gives insider perspective of policy process • Permits comparative analysis of different forces and influences for or against change, • Can provide vital information for future strategies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tendency to exaggerate their role in promoting change, • May be moved in the next reshuffle, election or coup and therefore not be a good guide to the future
Civil servants and agency staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • May have longer-term perspective than politicians • As insiders are often well placed to explain procedural and bureaucratic mechanisms and hurdles to policy change and implementation • May be able to expose inner workings and politics of organisation as well as disagreements which can be exploited in the future 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • May not have access to overall understanding of policy process • May be naturally conservative in their opinions about future change
Journalists	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can give another perspective on the politics of the policy process • Can give insights into the inputs, outputs and impact of media work in achieving change 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • May tend to sensationalise the mundane • Tendency to exaggerate their role in promoting change, • May not be able to reveal

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • May have access to insider information not available to others, as well as information on public attitudes and opinions 	sources and may need to 'trade' information for other favours
Academics, research and policy institutes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can give another perspective on the politics of the policy process • Can give insights into the inputs, outputs and impact of academic and research work in achieving policy change • May have access to insider information not available to others, as well as information on public attitudes and opinions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • May tend to overly academic analysis of impact biased by their particular discipline • Tendency to exaggerate their role in promoting change, often for their own career purposes • May actually be isolated from reality of policy process and public opinion
Public Opinion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gives understanding of changes in public attitudes and opinions and how these may have been brought about • and how public attitudes may have shaped decision making and policy changes • Can in itself be used for advocacy work so as to demonstrate public concern 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • greater problems of attribution given causality difficult to untangle • expensive to get representative view • difficult to aggregate and retain understanding of differences of opinions between groups

Appendix E: Checklist For The Evaluation Of Advocacy Website Contents

From: University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, College of Letters and Science, Edison Initiative. <http://www.uwm.edu/lets/edison/webevaluation/advocacy.html>

An Advocacy web site's primary purpose is to influence public opinion by presenting a particular agenda and/or point-of-view. Businesses, special interest groups, and other organizations are increasingly using the Internet to advance their organization's agenda.

The more you answer "yes," the greater the likelihood that the information is of high quality.

- **AUTHORITY**
 - Is the organization responsible for the contents of the site identified?
 - Is information about the goals of the organization available?
 - Is the legitimacy of this organization verifiable?
 - Is contact information including mailing address and phone number available?
 - Is there a statement that the site has the official approval of the organization?
 - Is the page sponsored by a national or local chapter of the organization?
 - Is the copyright holder of the information listed?
 - Is the copyright holder of the information an established publisher?
 - Are individual authors listed?
 - Are the credentials of the author(s) listed?
 - Is the page located on the organization's web site?
 - Is the text well written?

- **ACCURACY**
 - Are references to factual information clearly identified?
 - Are references cited from peer-reviewed journals or other credible publications?
 - Is the information presented part of the organization's expertise?
 - Is the information free of grammatical, spelling, and other typographical errors?
 - Are links to other sites present and relevant for the topic?
 - Are the links evaluated or summarized?
 - Does the page have an original publication date?
 - Is the site maintained and is the latest revision dated?

- **OBJECTIVITY**
 - Are the goals of the site clearly identified?
 - If advertising is present, is it clearly differentiated from the content?

- If the organization has a stake in the topic, is their interest in the topic clearly stated?
 - If the topic is controversial, are the organization's biases clearly presented?
 - Is the information presented balanced, with multiple points-of-view?
 - Is factual information kept separate from interpretation?
 - Are opinions clearly identified?
 - Is the text free of emotion and bias?
 - Is the organization and author free of a political or philosophical agenda?
- CURRENCY
 - Are there dates on the page to indicate:
 - When the page was written?
 - When the page was first placed on the Web?
 - When the page was last revised?
 - Are there any other indications that the material is kept current?
 - Is the data provided the most current information available on the topic?
 - Are the links current and up-to-date?
- COVERAGE
 - Is there an indication the page is complete, and not under construction?
 - Is it clear what topic the page intends to address?
 - Does the page address all the relevant issues of the topic?
 - If significant issues are left out, are reasons for their absence presented?
 - Is the information correctly cited with the most recent references?
 - Is the point of view of the organization presented in a clear manner with its arguments well supported?
- **Putting it all together**
 - Authority. If the site lists the organization and author of individual pages, and provides a way of contacting both the organization and author, and . . .
 - Accuracy. If the page lists the author's credentials and is properly referenced, and . . .
 - Objectivity. If the page provides accurate information that is well referenced and provides an objective assessment of the information, and . . .
 - Currency. If the site is recent and updated regularly, and the links are up-to-date, and . . .
 - Coverage. If the page is complete with few information gaps , then . . .

You may have a high quality advocacy web page.

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Appendix G: Lessons Available to DFID

A Review of NGO Approaches To The Evaluation Of Advocacy Work

Lessons Available to DFID

A summary presentation to DFID staff, Tuesday 7th August 2001

Background:

- One of two studies on "How to Evaluate the Effectiveness of DFID's Influence with Multilaterals",
- Commissioned by the America's and Transition Economies and Policy Department (ATEP) of the Eastern Europe and Western Hemisphere Division (EEWHD).
- Undertaken in May - June 2001
- By Dr Rick Davies, a Social Development consultant specialising in monitoring and evaluation, Cambridge, UK. Email: rick@shimbir.demon.co.uk Web: <http://www.mande.co.uk>

1. DEFINITIONS (have consequences)

1.1 Be careful with the use of significant terms.

- Influencing is a generic term. Where possible use more specific terms

Awareness raising	Capacity building	Lobbying	Campaigning
		Advocacy	
	Influencing		
(means to objectives)			

- Differentiate:
 - Advocacy from capacity building
 - Agreement as a starting point versus outcome
 - Lobbying from campaigning.
 - Private versus public disagreements
 - Complex versus simple messages
 - Different strategies with different consequences for M&E
- Monitor where the term "influencing" is used in preference and ask why.

1.2 Advocates have clients: Identify who the clients are and how they can be involved

- E.g. UK electorate, assisted national governments, civil society in those nations, the global poor.
- In the planning, *and* implementation and monitoring of DFID's multilateral influencing strategies.
- Answers will vary according to the specific type of practice being targeted within the multilateral

2. STRATEGIES

2.1 Plan for a *sustainable process* of improvement in the target multilaterals

- Not only by directly influencing multilaterals, *but also*
- By building the capacity of other stakeholders to influence multilaterals, *and*
- By developing opportunities (political space) for processes of influence to take place.

2.2 Think about DFID being part of a *network* of influencers rather than as a sole or primary actor.

- Identify allies at both global *and* recipient nation levels
- Identify where DFID has the most comparative advantage
- Identify mechanisms for mutual accountability about plans and progress

2.3 Give explicit recognition to the political nature of the advocacy aspect of influencing activities.

- Conflicting views will be the starting point. Agreement on particular objectives and methods will be a desired outcome (*contra* capacity building)
- Recognise DFID as a target as well as agent of influence, and monitor reciprocal influencing.
- Transparency strategies will be needed, not just blanket policies or neglect.

2.4 Take a balanced approach to monitoring the process of policy change

- Focus on establishing *normative* aspects of the process, despite valid *descriptions* of the actual policy development process as politicised and chaotic.
 - E.g. policies should be evidence based, policies should be implemented, implementation should be monitored.
- Develop a project cycle like conception of policy, which directs attention to implementation and monitoring, not just agenda setting, formulation and approval.

3. MONITORING AND EVALUATION PROCEDURES

3.1 Use M&E procedures that can cope with change and conflict

Outcomes are:	Expected	Unexpected
Of agreed meaning	Indicators useful here	?
Meaning is not agreed	?	?

- Monitor and analyse *unexpected changes*
- Monitor the emergence and resolution of significant *conflicts of opinion*.

3.2 Document the expected process of influence as well as the end result.

- To help clarify their plausibility,
- To identify where to look for evidence when assessing achievements,
- To help weight the significance of any partial achievements

3.3 Develop the current list of meeting process indicators suitable for lobbying activities

- Check their DFID applicability, and add
- Look specifically for trust indicators
- Test "emergence and resolution of differences" approach

3.4 Treat multilaterals' budgets (and expenditure) as important statements of policy and evidence of implementation.

- Monitor their accessibility and transparency to stakeholders in the change
- Contextualise reports of changes achieved in budget allocations (include other changes and non-changes)

3.5 Manage the likely bias in analyses of DFID's role in reported policy changes by building in compensatory requirements:

- Willingness to expose claims to external audiences
- Contextualised reporting, of other changes and non-changes
- Explicate claims through justified ranking exercises

[Legitimacy / reputation issues dealt with by ITAD presentation]

4. ISSUES FOR DFID

4.1 Internal M&E practices

- How to integrate central office and country level processes
- How to develop better means of documenting parallel processes of change and their interactions
- What types of objectives should be documented in public ISP-type statements.

4.2 Strategies for monitoring implementation of policy changes

- Identify when to use:
 - Direct follow up by DFID, or allies
 - Self-reporting by multilateral, and associated degrees of transparency
 - Third party monitoring
 - Public monitoring
- Monitor ownership of the monitoring process, as indicated by who pays the costs and how much they pay (absolute and proportion).

4.3 Designing a learning process: What elements in what combination?

- External evaluations of ISP achievements (E.g. IFRC)
- Internal reviews of the ISP revision process (E.g. PAN & Phil Evans UNIFEM review)
- Peer agency reviews of progress reports on influencing of specific multilaterals
- M&E consultant reviews of monitoring and evaluation provisions within influencing plans, and their implementation in progress reports.

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